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ARTICLES

LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF JAPANESE
EMPLOYERS TO SELECT EMPLOYEES OF THEIR
CHOICE UNDER THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION
Robert Abraham*
INTRODUCTION
Within the past two decades, Japanese corporations have invested in
and expanded their operations in the United States at an extremely
rapid rate." Commentators have predicted that, based on the dollar
amount of acquisitions within the past few years, Japanese companies
could become the largest foreign employers of American businesses by
the early 1990's.2 A significant portion of Japanese investment in the

United States has been achieved by forming subsidiaries and establishing branches of major Japanese trading companies. Many of these subsidiaries and local branches fill key executive positions almost exclusively with Japanese nationals.3 Japanese companies emphasize that
* Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. The views
expressed are not necessarily those of the Justice Department. This article is dedicated
with love to Appa and Amma. Special thanks to Jim Coppess for reading and commenting on several drafts. Thanks also to Susan Berman and Barbara Axelsson for
reading and commenting on portions of the article.
1. See N.Y. Times, July 17, 1990, at D5 (stating that Japanese acquisitions of
American companies were valued at $3.8 billion during the first half of 1990).
2. See Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1990, at A22 (noting that Japanese companies and banks participated in 174 acquisitions of American corporations in 1989).
The dollar amount of those acquisitions totaled a record $13.7 billion. Id. British investment, traditionally the greatest both in terms of transactions and dollars, declined
by 47% to $16.8 billion in 1984. Id.
3. See Comment, Clash of the Cultures: U.S. - Japan Treaty of Friendship Title
VII, and Women in Management, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 337, 350 n.3 (1990), [hereinafter Comment, Women in Management], citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86, 88 n.2 (1973) (finding that citizenship differs from national origin). National origin
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this practice is justified because of the need to fill key executive positions with persons who understand the unique business practices and
the basic cultural values that underlie Japanese businesses' traditional
methods of operation.' This practice has resulted in several lawsuits
filed by American employees against their Japanese employers on the
grounds that they were discriminated against on the basis of race, sex,
national origin, or citizenship because they were not hired for key executive positions by their Japanese employers. 5 Most of these lawsuits
have been filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII),6 which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, and religion. 7 Since 1986, employees
have also been able to file suit against employers under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 8 which prohibits employers
from discriminating against persons in their hiring practices on the basis of citizenship or national origin. 9
Japanese employers defend their actions, asserting that their practices are expressly protected by the United States-Japan Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (Japan Treaty or Friendship
Treaty).10 Japanese employers assert that the Friendship Treaty gives
them an absolute right to place Japanese nationals of their choice in
key executive positions, and that the Treaty insulates them from compliance with Title VII and the IRCA. 1
refers to the country in which a person is born, or in a larger sense, from where his or
her ancestors originated. Id. Throughout this Article, the term "national" and "citizen"
will be used in the context described above.
4. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at C14 (alluding to the cultural clash between
Japanese managers and American workers at Mazda's Flat Rock, Michigan plant).
5. See infra notes 19, 175, and 186-194 and accompanying text (describing the
employment discrimination lawsuits filed by American citizens against their Japanese
employers).
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-57 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988)).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
8. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1987) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA].
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(a)(l). Protection against discriminatory hiring practices is
not extended to unauthorized aliens. Id.
10. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United StatesJapan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter Japan Treaty or Friendship
Treaty].
11. See, e.g., Sumitomo Shosi Am. v. Avagliano. 457 U.S. 176, 177 (1982) (noting
Japanese company's motion to dismiss on grounds that practices are protected under
Friendship Treaty).
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I. OVERVIEW
Section II of this Article examines the differences between Japanese
and American business practices, focusing on the contention that Japanese business practices are intertwined with Japanese culture, and
therefore cannot be readily learned by non-Japanese. The Article then
examines the language and legislative history of the Japan Treaty and
concludes that the Treaty does permit Japanese employers absolute discretion to choose only Japanese nationals for key executive positions.
Section III similarly examines the language and legislative history of
Title VII and concludes that it does apply to Japanese employers doing
business in the United States. While Title VII does apply to Japanese
employers, it is not readily apparent that the specific practice of selecting Japanese nationals exclusively is in violation of Title VII. Therefore, Japanese employment practices are scrutinized under two discrimination theories recognized under Title VII. Specifically, section IV
reviews the theories of disparate impact and disparate treatment to determine whether the nearly exclusive selection of Japanese nationals for
key executive positions is discriminatory.
Section V analyzes the bona fide occupational qualification defense
(BFOQ).' 2 The BFOQ defense permits what is normally considered a
discriminatory practice on the ground that such a practice is essential
to the business."3 The BFOQ defense has been asserted primarily where
the protected class of persons cannot qualify for a particular job be4
cause they lack certain immutable characteristics required by the job.
Section V briefly discusses whether national origin characteristics are
relevant to the qualities sought by a Japanese employer and emphasizes
that Japanese employers should make employment decisions not on the
basis of broad BFOQ classifications, but instead on the basis of individual employee qualifications. Section V concludes that, based on current
discrimination theories, Japanese employment practices are prohibited
by Title VII.
Section VI describes and applies basic conflict of law principles and
concludes that under such rules, the Japan Treaty prevails over Title
VII. Therefore, the Treaty grants Japanese employers the right to se12. Title VII § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (1988). Section 703(e) provides
that it is not an illegal business practice for an employer to hire and retain employees
on the basis of national origin in situations where it is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the regular conduct of that particular business. Id.
13. Id.
14.

See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text (discussing cases where Japa-

nese employers invoked BFOQ defense).
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lect employees of their choice, even where such practices are proscribed
by Title VII.
Section VII examines the constitutional equal protection argument.
The equal protection argument possesses several advantages over Title
VII, the greatest of which is that equal protection under the law is
required by the United States Constitution and must, therefore, prevail
over the Japan Treaty. A successful equal protection argument is not
possible here, however, due to the lack of requisite state action. Section
VII concludes that a more expansive interpretation of state action
should be developed so that private discriminatory acts sheltered by
federal legislation will be viewed as state action.
Section VIII reviews the IRCA. Many Japanese employers, in order
to avoid Title VII claims, initially assert that they made employee selections on the basis of employee citizenship.' 5 Such an assertion, if
accepted at face value, avoids the need to comply with Title VII because under Title VII, citizenship is not a protected class. 16 However,
under the IRCA, selecting an employee on the basis of citizenship is
clearly discriminatory."7 Consequently, another conflict arises, this time
between the Japan Treaty, which permits Japanese employers to select
employees of their choosing, and the IRCA, which limits the Japanese
employer from making choices based on citizenship. Section VIII explores whether the Japan Treaty provides a defense to citizenship discrimination and concludes that unlike Title VII, the IRCA prevails
over the Treaty under conflict of laws principles.
Finally, the Article engages in a policy examination of Japanese employer practices. It concludes that although the Japan Treaty might
prevail over Title VII proscriptions, it is nonetheless more prudent for
the Japanese employer to forego the protection of the Treaty, and make
employment decisions on the unassailable criterion of employee
qualifications.
This Article assumes that the Japanese employer seeking the protection of the Japan Treaty falls within the ambit of the Treaty. Many
Japanese employers conducting business in the United States are subsidiaries of a parent Japanese company. 8 This poses the issue of
15. See infra notes 154-163 and accompanying text (discussing employers' discrimination based on citizenship).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988) (forbidding employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B).
18. See Iannone, Policy Implications of Foreign Business Recruitment as an Economic Development Strategy: The Case of Japanese Automotive Investment in the
United States, 6 EcoN. DEv. REV. 25, 36 (1988) (indicating that Japanese auto manufacturers are expected to sell 1,385,000 American-built cars through their subsidiaries
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whether a Japanese subsidiary can raise the Japan Treaty as a defense
in the same manner as its parent company. This matter will not be
addressed here as it was already addressed by the Supreme Court in
19829 and has been the subject of numerous law review articles. 20 Furthermore, this Article makes no effort to determine which jobs constitute "key executive positions." Article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty

grants Japanese employers the unqualified right to select employees of
their choice for key executive positions.21 Some employees have argued
that the position they applied for was not a key executive position, and
that therefore, their Japanese employer could not rely upon the Japan
Treaty.
II.

DIFFERENCES IN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN

BUSINESS PRACTICES
At the outset, it is important to understand why Japanese employers
insist on hiring Japanese nationals for key executive positions. Japanese
employers claim that they select exclusively Japanese employees for
key positions because of well-recognized differences in business and
management practices between Japan and the United States. 22 According to Japanese employers, these differences in business and managein the United States in 1991). That represents a 12.5% share of the American car
market. Id. See also N.Y. Times, supra note 4, at C14 (noting that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry believed that 840,000 Americans would be
working for Japanese companies by 1990).
19. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176.
20. Note, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights under Commercial Treaties to Hire Employees "of Their Choice", 86 COLUM. L. REV. 139
(1986); Berman, International Economics and American Employment Relations, 28
B.C.L. REV. 27 (1986); Note, Amenability of Foreign Corporationsto United States
Employment Discrimination Laws, 14 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 197 (1981).
21. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, 4 U.S.T. at 270. See also Note, Commercial
Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31
STAN. L. REV. 947, 952 (1979) [hereinafter Note, Commercial Treaties] (commenting
that the United States and Japan likely intended the "of their choice" section to permit
Japanese employers the right to select Japanese citizens for key executive positions).
22. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations and Legal Implications of Their Possible Use in the United States, 5 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 585, 586 (1988) [hereinafter
Comment, Japanese Labor Relations] (explaining that Japanese employers seek to
achieve harmony with their workers). Japanese business management practices focus
on labor relations and seek to ensure greater worker participation and loyalty. Id. at
594-99. American business management practices concentrate on efficiency and tend to
view workers as tools of production. Id. at 595-96. See also Zhang & Kuroda, Beware
of Japanese Negotiation Style: How to Negotiate with Japanese Companies. 10 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 195, 197-201 (1989) [hereinafter Zhang] (observing that Japanese
negotiation techniques emphasize step-by-step negotiations and collective decisionmaking).
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ment practices reflect a core cultural difference between the two coun23
tries - the importance of the group versus the individual.
There is general consensus that Japanese culture emphasizes the primacy of the group. 4 Reflecting its feudal past when social status regulated relationships, as well as the religious influences of Shinto and
Confucianism, Japanese culture emphasizes stable and harmonious social relationships. 25 A commentator summarized that Japan's homogeneous population shares traditional values. The family is the center of

society and other social relationships are modeled to imitate it. 20
In contrast, American culture has traditionally emphasized the primacy of the individual. 7 Sociologist Robert Bellah wrote that
"[i]ndividualism lies at the very core of American culture. ' 28 Some
commentators, like Bellah, see this individualism as a major cause of

alienation and malaise conflict in American society,29 while others see
it as the guiding value which enables America to maintain its economic
and political drive,30 but there is general consensus that individualism
is a quintessential American characteristic.

Not surprisingly, many Japanese business practices which reflect Japan's emphasis on group interest,3" are different from the "individualistic" business practices prevalent in the United States. The typical Japanese company adheres to fundamental cultural values such as loyalty
23. See Zhang, supra note 22, at 200 (explaining that the three hallmarks of Japanese management style - company unions, life-time employment, and seniority ranking - reflect the Japanese cultural emphasis on the group). American culture emphasizes the importance of the individual. Id.
24. See J.S. BAKER, JAPANESE ART 7-8 (1984) (discussing the uniqueness of Japanese culture and the various influences of other cultures on Japanese art). The uniqueness of Japanese culture stems not from an indigenous development free from outside
influence, but rather from adapting to and transforming the influences of various cultures that have reached Japan. Id. at 7.
25. Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 588-89. The group's
interest, as opposed to the individual's, must be preeminent in order to ensure social
harmony. Id. at 590-91.
26. Id.
27.

See

R.

BELLAH, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN

AMERICAN LIFE 142 (1985) (writing that individualism is a fundamental American
cultural value).

28. Id.
29. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 587 (asserting that
the American emphasis on individual rights and duties impinges upon labor-management cooperation because it fosters conflict within that relationship).
30. FALLOWS, MORE LIKE Us (1989).
31. See D. HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING 276 (1986) [hereinafter HALBERSTAM]
(discussing Japanese people and their respect for work, elders and superiors, and their
ambition to succeed). The Japanese also stressed education as a means to achievement
with more force than their American counterparts. Id.
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to superiors and the emphasis of the group over the individual.3 2 Japanese companies attempt to hire only those persons who are likely to fit

into the company environment and not engender conflict.3 3 Guaranteed
lifetime employment is an expectation shared both by the Japanese em-

ployer and its employees, and underlying this expectation are the cultural values of loyalty and social harmony."' Japanese employers often
engage in activities considered outside of the scope of the employer/
employee relationship in the United States, such as arranging marriages and obtaining good housing for employees and good schooling

for their children."
Japan's seniority-based compensation system assumes that an employee's value is inextricably tied to his or her experience and commitment to the company." In return for guaranteed lifetime employment,
the typical Japanese company expects its employees to accept different
positions, undergo extended training, and remain completely loyal to
the company.37 The decision-making process at Japanese companies
emphasizes consensus and group participation. 8
32. See Sethi & Swanson, Are Foreign Multinationals Violating U.S. Civil Rights
Laws?, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 485, 503-05 (1979) [hereinafter Sethi] (discussing how
Japanese business practices, such as lifetime employment and a seniority-based wage
system, incorporate traditional Japanese values such as loyalty to superiors, the primacy of the group, self-pride, and hard work).
33. Id. at 503.
34. Id. at 504. The employee expects lifetime employment as a norm of Japanese
work life. Id. The employer expects that the employee will remain if he or she is provided normal wages and work conditions. Id. The Japanese commitment to lifetime
employment is so strong that employers will rotate employees to other jobs if an employee's regular work is interrupted by adverse economic conditions. See Comment,
Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 594-95 (noting that during the 1973 oil
crisis, surplus steel employees were assigned to work as tree planters landscaping company property until the crisis subsided). Japanese companies are imbued with a strong
sense of paternalism, which is symbolized by their sponsoring of social events, recreational activities and holiday parties for employers. Id. at 595.
35. Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 595.
36. Sethi, supra note 32, at 503-04. Compensation is premised on a worker's value
to the company as a whole rather than on his or her production over a certain period of
time or on a specific project. Id. at 503.
37. Id. at 505.
38. Id. at 507. Japanese management is characterized by "ringisei" or management
by consensus. Id. New proposals are initiated by lower-level company employees and
then passed along to successively higher echelons of management for comments and
corrections. Id. Proposals that meet with approval are finally given to the chief executive officer. Id. The proposal becomes official upon the chief executive officer's approval
and is returned to the originating employee for implementation. Id. Japanese management also solicits input from employees with respect to improving or streamlining company operations. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 596 (explaining that this policy of increased participation motivates employees to be assertive
and work harder because it gives them a sense of owning a stake in the company's
achievements).
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By contrast, American businesses generally do not establish a close,
familial relationship with their employees. 39 In fact, historically, American labor-management relations have been adversarial.40 Within this
adversarial context, American businesses generally compensate employees on the basis of "equal pay for equal work" and individual effort. 4 '
Consequently, under such a compensation system, a worker's value is
primarily a factor of his or her output and not his or her relationship to
the company or its other employees.' 2
While Japanese managers seek to reduce the social distinctions between labor and management, 43 American management has typically
exacerbated such social distinctions, particularly in the area of compensation. Unlike their Japanese counterparts, American managers
rarely work beside their employees on the production line. 40 Decisionmaking discussions among American managers are frank, with little
emphasis on maintaining harmony and unity.4' While Japanese business decision-making is gradual, consensual, and involves lower echelon
employees,'4 American managers tend to make decisions with little employee input.48

39. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 594-95 (observing
that the labor force in the United States is highly mobile and often connected to its
employers only by a paycheck).
40. Id. at 595-97 (commenting on American labor-management relations). American management theories traditionally viewed labor as simply a factor of production.
Id. at 595. Impersonal employer-employee relations were the norm, due to the widespread adoption of Frederick Taylor's scientific management theories. Id. at 595 n.88.
Labor's attempts to form unions were met with hostility and violence. Id. at 597.
41. Sethi, supra note 32, at 503. Age and seniority do not mean higher pay unless
they are related to improved work performance. Id.
42. Id. In Japan, long-term employees who reach supervisory status must possess
more than mere technical proficiency at their jobs. Id. at 504. They must be able to
maintain group cohesiveness and well-being. Id.
43. Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 597.
44. See Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1990, at D3 (indicating that the typical CEO of a
sizable American corporation earns 35 times more than the typical American manufacturing employee). In Japan, this ratio is only 15 to I. Id.
45. Comment, JapaneseLabor Relations, supra note 22, at 597. Japanese managers work on the production line to gain a thorough understanding of the entire business
operation and process. Id. An American manager who might attempt to work beside
employees on the production line is sometimes prevented from doing so because of
union rules. Id. at 597-98.
46. Sethi, supra note 32, at 506. American businesspersons are generally quite verbal and demand specificity in their negotiations. Id. Japanese managers, on the other
hand, are vague and general in their decision-making discussions, so as to avoid specific
problems that could cause conflict. Id.
47. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining the "ringisei" system).
See also Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 596 (discussing how
employee ideas are solicited through quality control circles).
48. See Zhang, supra note 22, at 200 (detailing the efficiency of the "ringisei"
system in contrast to American management's decision-making process). See also
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Japanese employers assert that fundamental differences such as these
prompt them to hire Japanese citizens for key executive positionsA0
Key executives are generally defined as those who make significant decisions, set policy, and implement the basic rules of operation within
the company. Japanese companies conducting business in the United
States believe it is essential that significant employees be Japanese citizens because of the need for an understanding of Japanese culture and
business management practices.50 Even when transferred to a foreign
country, the Japanese employee readily retains this cultural awareness,
thus permitting a smooth exchange of ideas and policies between the
parent company in Japan and its subsidiary in the United States."'
Maintaining a strong Japanese management presence is an effective
means by which Japanese companies can control their American subsidiaries. 2 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) has stated that "the ability of Japanese investors to dispatch
executive employees from Japan to manage and control their overseas
subsidiaries is of the greatest importance and indeed is a basic prerequisite for the successful management of their overseas business activities."53 For these reasons, many Japanese employers rely upon article
Johnson & Ouchi, Made in America (Under Japanese Management),

HARV.

Bus.

REv., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 61 (discussing four characteristic differences between Japanese and American managerial methods). In Japan, information runs from lower management to upper management. Id. Upper management reviews lower management decision-making. Id. Middle management is employed to provide answers to problems. Id.
Finally, consensual decision-making is emphasized. Id.
49.

See Sethi, supra note 32, at 507-08 (explaining that C. ltoh & Company, a

Japanese trading company, excluded Americans from high level staff meetings because
it was believed that American employees "lacked the feeling or intuition" of Japanese
employees).
50. See Lansing & Palmer, Sumitomo Shoji v. Avagliano: Sayonara to Japanese
Employment Practices in Conflict with Title VII, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 153, 166-67
(1984) [hereinafter Lansing] (describing Japanese trading companies). Japanese trad-

ing companies, which are crucial to Japanese economic success and which have offices
in approximately 100 foreign cities, require particularized skills and training that few

Americans possess. Id.
51.

See SETHI, JAPANESE BUSINESS AND

SOCIAL CONFLICT

47 (1975) [hereinafter

JAPANESE BUSINESS] (explaining that Japanese managers serving abroad understand
that their futures depend not on performance but on knowing the conditions under
which their Japanese parent companies operate and conduct business). Consequently,

Japanese managers typically insulate themselves from the local culture and focus on
what the home office desires. Id.
52. Accord Lansing, supra note 50, at 165-66 (describing how Japanese trading
companies depend almost exclusively on Japanese managers to manage their

subsidiaries).
53.

Amicus Brief of MITI at 5, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano. 457 U.S.

176 (1982) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
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VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty as legal support for their policy
of
54
selecting Japanese citizens exclusively for key executive positions.
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION - LANGUAGE AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Many American employees of Japanese firms are not persuaded by
this explanation of fundamental differences between Japanese and
American business management practices.5 5 They assert that the Japanese employers' practices are in violation of Title VII and the IRCA.
They contend that Japan has traditionally viewed the foreigner with
distrust, and that Japanese society discriminates against women and
minorities.56 Many have filed suit under Title VII, while Japanese employers counter by asserting that their employment practices are legitimate and specifically authorized by the Japan Treaty."'

An analysis of the scope and application of both Title VII and the
Treaty is necessary to resolve this conflict. Proper interpretation of the
above requires examining the language of Title VII and the Treaty, the
intent of the signatories of the Treaty and the drafters of Title VII, and
the interpretations attributed to the Treaty and Title VII by the United

States State Department and the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission (EEOC), respectively. 8 The analysis begins with a study
of the Japan Treaty's legislative history.
54. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese employers'
resort to article VIII).
55. See infra 212-214 and accompanying text (questioning assertions of fundamental differences between American and Japanese business practices).
56.

See Comment, Women in Management, supra note 3, at 337 (discussing the

treatment of women in Japanese companies). In 1990, only 1.29% of the managers in
Japanese companies were female. Id. Only 0.2% of the division chiefs and corporate
directors in Japanese companies were women. Id. In 1988, Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc. settled a federal discrimination complaint with black and female employees amounting to approximately $6 million in back pay. Cole & Deskins, Racial
Factors in Site Location and Employment Patterns in Japanese Auto Firms in
America, 31 CAL. MGMT. REV. 9 (1988) [hereinafter Cole). Japanese auto manufac-

turers and parts suppliers have located many of their plants in regions with very small
black populations. Id. at 13. Japanese auto manufacturers also hire fewer blacks than
would be expected based on the population employment potential. Id. at 15. For example, based on the population employment potential, 10.5 % of the employees at Honda's
Marysville, Ohio plant should be black but only 2.8% are. Id.
57. See supra note I1 and accompanying text (considering Japanese employment
practices).
58. See Lansing, supra note 50, at 159-61 (describing the State Department's interpretation of friendship treaties in general and the EEOC's interpretation of Title
Vll).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Following World War II, the United States signed over fifteen commercial treaties, known as friendship treaties, with more than two
dozen nations.5 9 The treaties' objective was to promote economic
growth through the establishment of legal mechanisms to facilitate international trade.6 0 Moreover, the friendship treaties, in an attempt to
prevent businesses from suffering discriminatory treatment in foreign
markets, specified the treatment to be accorded foreign firms. 61 The
most common type of treatment was "national treatment," which pro2
vided foreign firms the same rights accorded to domestic companies.0
Other types of treatment included "most-favored-nation" treatment,
defined as treatment no less favorable than that under which the most
privileged foreign company operated," and "absolute, non-contingent"
treatment, which provided "foreign companies a certain specified protection without regard of whether the same protection was provided to
host country business. "
The United States and Japan signed a friendship treaty in 1953.65
The Friendship Treaty is comprised of the Protocol and twenty-five ar-

ticles.16 Each article addresses a specific business concern such as workers' compensation, 67 access to the host country's legal system, 8 protection of business property from unlawful entry and molestation, 9 and
the right to transfer funds from the host country to the home country.70

Most of the articles identify not only a specific business concern but
59. Walker, Treatiesfor the Encouragement and Protectionof Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Cobip. L. 229, 229 (1956) [hereinafter
Walker].
60. Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 949, n.14. See also Sen. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, Treaties of Friendship. Commerce. and Navigation, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953) [hereinafter 1953 Report] (asserting that
the one main purpose of the treaties was to further American economic foreign policy
goals).
61. Note, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and United States Discrimination Law: The Right of Branches of Foreign Companies to Hire Executives -of
Their Choice", 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 765, 767-68 (1989).
62. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship. Commerce and Navigation, 42 MiNN.
L. REv. 805, 811 (1958) [hereinafter Modern Treaties].
63. Id.
64. MacNamara v. Korean Airlines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1143 (3d Cir. 1988), (citing
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176. 188 n.18 (1982)).
65. Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 949.
66. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, 4 U.S.T. at 2066-81.
67. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. III, 4 U.S.T. at 2067.
68. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV, 4 U.S.T. 2067-68.
69. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI, 4 U.S.T. at 2068-69.
70. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII, 4 U.S.T. at 2072-73.
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also the standard of treatment with respect to that business concern.
Foreign firms, for example, are accorded national treatment with respect to workers' compensation,72 national treatment and most-favorednation treatment with respect to access to the legal system, 73 and national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
74
protection of business property.
Article VIII specifies no standard of treatment.7" Article VIII(l)
provides in relevant part that "[n]ationals and companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other
Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."' " Japanese firms
that conduct business in the United States have used this provision to
argue that they have an unqualified right to choose Japanese nationals
exclusively for key executive positions." They assert that article
VIII(l), because it contains the broad phrase "of their choice," gives
Japanese employers an absolute right to choose Japanese nationals for
key executive positions, without regard for Title VII or other United
States employment discrimination laws. 78 There is strong evidence in
the Treaty's legislative history to support this contention.
The language of article VIII(l) is unequivocal: The Japanese firm
shall be permitted to choose "technical experts, executive personnel
...and other specialists of their choice. '7'9 The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[a] basic maxim of treaty interpretation is that the
clear meaning of treaty language controls unless such application leads
to a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of those who
signed it." 80 As noted earlier, most of the Treaty provisions, in addition
to specifying the rights granted or the activities protected, also specify
the standard of treatment to be accorded. 8' Article VIII(l) is the sig71. See supra note 67-74 and accompanying text (discussing standard of treatment
accorded to various business concerns).
72. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. III, 4 U.S.T. at 2067.
73. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV, 4 U.S.T. at 2067-68.
74. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI, 4 U.S.T. at 2068-69.
75. Japan Treaty, supra note I0,art. VIII, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
76. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII, para. (1), 4 U.S.T. at 2070 (emphasis
added).
77. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 176; Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d
353 (5th Cir. 1981).
78.

Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182.

79. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
80. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49,
54 (1963)).
81. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing standards of
treatment).
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nificant exception to this rule.

2

Some have interpreted the absence of a

standard of treatment in article VIII(l) to mean that article VIII(l)
grants Japanese firms an absolute right to choose only Japanese nation-

als for key executive positions.8
This position was supported by Herman Walker, the Advisor on
Commercial Treaties at the State Department at the time several
friendship treaties were drafted. 4 Walker highlighted article VIII(l)
as an example of an absolute right. 85 Such a straightforward assertion
by one of the principal drafters of the Japan Treaty is strong evidence
that article VIII(l) grants to the Japanese employer an absolute right
to select nationals of its choosing, free from local laws.
Notably, similar provisions in other friendship treaties ratified during
the same period as the Japanese Treaty expressly limit foreign employers' right to hire their own nationals.88 This indicates that the drafters
of the Japan Treaty had an opportunity to include limitations on Japa-

nese employers' right to select employees of their choice. Thus, the
drafters', failure to exercise this opportunity is significant.
Despite this evidence, some courts and commentators have concluded
that article VIII(l) does not give Japanese employers an unfettered

right to choose key executives.8 7 They claim instead, that article
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that article VIII(l) does not
specify a standard of treatment).
83. Walker, supra note 59, at 234 n.15. Walker stated that "[i]n the matter of
employment, provisions have been developed technically going beyond national treatment, to prevent the imposition of ultranationalistic policies with respect to essential
executive and technical personnel." Id. (emphasis added). Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 5 Aht. J.INT'L. L. 373, 386 (1956) (emphasis added), [hereinafter Provisions on Companies].
84. Provisions on Companies, supra note 83, at 386.
85. Id.
86. See, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United
States-Ireland, art. VI, para. 1,1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155 [hereinafter Ireland
Treaty] (maintaining that foreign employers select employees based on national treatment standards); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951,
United States-Greece, art. XII, para. 4, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1857-59, T.I.A.S. No. 3057
[hereinafter Greece Treaty] (acknowledging that foreign companies can hire employees
"of their choice regardless of nationality"); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Protocol, Nov. 12, 1959, United States-Pakistan, art. VIII, para. 1, 12 U.S.T. 110, 114,
T.I.A.S. No. 4683 [hereinafter Pakistan Treaty] (declaring that foreign companies
have the right to hire employees of their choice only "in accordance with applicable
laws").
87. See Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 951 n.21 (indicating that the
legislative history of other similar commercial treaties with limitations on hiring does
not reveal that a different interpretation was intended from the Japan Treaty). These
commentators reason that the omission of a specific treatment standard from article
VIII(1) of the Japan Treaty is not significant and should be interpreted exactly as the
provisions in the other treaties which specify national treatment with the "choice of
employees" provision. Id. at 952. See MacNamara v. Korean Airlines. 863 F.2d 1135,
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VIII(l) permits Japanese employers to ignore "percentile" restrictions,
which discriminate on the basis of citizenship, but does not permit
them to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or age.85
Percentile laws require foreign companies to hire a fixed percentage of
employees from the "indigenous population."

9

These laws which ex-

isted in several countries during the period when the friendship treaties
were drafted had a discernable impact on American corporations.?0
Such restrictions required American firms to hire a fixed percentage of
employees from the indigenous population."
Many thought percentile restrictions limited American firms in selecting Americans for key executive positions and thereby restricted
United States investment abroad.

2

The United States government was

acutely aware of this problem, and the legislative histories of certain
friendship treaties indicate that the employer choice provisions were

specifically inserted in order to protect American corporations from
percentile restrictions abroad.9 3 Proponents of the "percentile" argument interpret this evidence as supporting their view that article
94
VIII(l) was intended solely to avoid percentile restrictions.
1144 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that there was no logical conflict between an "of their
choice" employee hiring provision in The United States-Korea Treaty and Title VII of
the ADEA); Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding
that article XII, the "of their choice" employee hiring provision in the Greece Treaty,
was intended to be a narrow privilege to permit employment of Greek citizens for some
high-level positions, not a complete exemption from compliance with United States labor laws); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981),
rev'd 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (holding that article VIII(l) did not exempt wholly-owned
Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States from Title VII). See also
Cooper, Japanese Corporationsand American Civil Rights Laws, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 93, 93-107 (1982) (suggesting that the Supreme Court, in deciding Sumitomo,
could have taken a bolder stance against employment discrimination by holding that
article VIII(l) does not permit discrimination).
88. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188 (explaining that the friendship treaties grant
foreign companies no greater rights than domestic companies; i.e., national treatment).
See also MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144-46 (determining that the "of their choice" key
employee hiring provision of the Korea Treaty allowed a limited privilege to hire noncitizens).
89. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144 (quoting Wickes, 745 F.2d at 367-68 n.l).
90. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (introducing Title VII).
91. Wickes, 745 F.2d at 367 n.l.
92.

Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 952-53.

93. S.EXEC. REP., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1950). This report, which relates to a
United States-Uruguay commercial treaty, stressed the need for American firms to be
guaranteed the right to "employ American, as distinguished from foreign, technical
experts, creative personnel, attorneys and other specialized employees." Id. The United
States-Uruguay Treaty served as a model for the Japan Treaty. Comment, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 953 n.31.

94. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (detailing the "percentile"
argument).
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Another argument against a broad interpretation of article VIII(l) is
that by the time the Japan Treaty was signed in 1953, nine states had
civil rights laws forbidding private employment discrimination." This
argument contends that there is nothing in the legislative histories of
the friendship treaties that suggest that they were intended to override
existing state laws.

6

None of these arguments explains why some treaties of this period
specifically place limits on the employer's right to choose employees,m

while the Japan Treaty contains no such specific limitation. 8 It is not
convincing to ascribe such divergence to omission. 9 When the Japan
Treaty was created, the drafters were aware of other friendship treaties
which specifically place limitations on the employer's right to choose
key executives.

The fact that several states statutorily prohibited private employment discrimination is also not a convincing argument against a broad
interpretation of article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty. Under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, where state law is
inconsistent with federal law, federal law prevails.100 This fundamental
constitutional principle was well established during the period when the
Japan Treaty was drafted.101 If the Treaty drafters did not wish to un95. See Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368, (citing Comment, Commercial Treaties, supra
note 21, at 951 n.23 (naming the nine states with civil rights statutes: Connecticut,
Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Washington)).
96. See Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368 (discussing the Greece Treaty). A State Department legal adviser informed Congress that the Greece Treaty would not impact existing state laws except those relating to restrictions on the practice of certain professions by noncitizens. Id. (citing Commercial Treaties: Hearings on Treaties of
Friendship,Commerce, and Navigation with Israel, Ethiopia, Italy. Denmark. Greece.
Finland, Germany and Japan Before the Subcomm. on Commercial Treaties of the
Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1953) [hereinafter 1953
Hearings]). Although Wickes involved the Greece Treaty, the arguments raised by the
court are relevant because the treaty was ratified during the same period as the Japan
Treaty.
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting those Friendship Treaties
which specifically limit foreign employers' rights to select employees).
98. See Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2070 (containing no
express limitation on a Japanese employer's right to hire "technical experts, executive
personnel [and] . . .other specialists of their choice").
99. But see Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 951 n.21, citing S. EXEC.
Doc. P, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1966) (referring to the Treaty of Amity & Economic
Relations, May 29, 1966, United States-Thailand, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540).
A letter from the Secretary of State to Congress regarding the Thailand Treaty noted
that the Treaty possessed "the basic provisions [of the Japanese Treaty] considered of
major value from the standpoint of United States interests." Id.
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
101. See Spiess, 643 F.2d at 356 (noting that the Friendship Treaties supersede
inconsistent state law).
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dermine state employment discrimination laws, they would have specified as much within the Treaty. Yet, article VIII(l) does not contain
any language suggesting that it be interpreted subject to existing state
10 2
law.
The most serious flaw in the percentile argument is that it only
presents part of the picture. While Congress might have been somewhat concerned with percentile restrictions, its objective in drafting the
Treaty was much broader. 108 In the years immediately following World
War II, it was primarily United States investors who were able to
make substantial foreign investments.1 0° Certainly after the devastation
Japan suffered in World War II and until 1952 when the Allied occupation of Japan formally ended, Japan had no ability to engage in foreign investment, and' 05 the United States Congress was well aware of
this serious imbalance of economic power.' 06
Indeed, Congress could not help but be aware of the imbalance after
authorizing over two billion dollars in food, fertilizer, and industrial
products to aid Japan's recovery. 0 7 Congress' Committee on Foreign
Relations reflected this awareness when it noted that "in many cases
the United States is in the position of seeking opportunity for American
business abroad when, as a practical matter, foreign business may not
be seeking similar opportunities in the United States."' 0 8 What this
suggests is that Congress wanted to help American business exploit its
superior economic position in the immediate post-war period.' 0 0 The
early 1950's were a period when American business interests were
102. See Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. at 2070 (containing
no reference to existing state law).
103. See 1953 Report, supra note 60 (noting that in drafting the Treaties, Congress sought to increase private investment with Treaty countries).
104. Lansing, supra note 50, at 156-57 n.25.
105.
in

Id., citing Patrick & Rosovsky, Japan'sEconomic Performance: An Overview,
How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS II (H. Patrick and H.

ASIA'S NEW GIANT:

Rosovsky, ed. 1976).
106. See Lansing, supra note 50, at 156-57 (noting that Congress created protection essentially for American foreign investments because it was the only nation capable of serious foreign investment immediately following World War II).
107. COHEN, REMAKING
(1987) [hereinafter COHEN].
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108. 1953 Report, supra note 60, at 11.
109. See Lansing, supra note 50, at 158 (referring to a Senate Executive Report
concerning the Japanese Treaty). The Senate Report stated that article Vlll(l)'s purpose was to avoid employment restrictions under local law. Id. Congress was aware that
the incentive to invest in foreign countries was significantly reduced when profitability
was hampered by having to teach domestics to work in significant managerial and technical positions. Id. Congress wanted to assure American firms abroad that they could
reserve key managerial and technical positions for American citizens. Id.
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thought to coincide with American interests in general,110 a period
when a General Motors executive allegedly quipped that "what's good
for GM is good for the country." ' In the spirit of these times, one can
see why article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty was designed not just to
overcome percentile restrictions, but also to immunize American companies from any foreign barriers that might hinder American business.
Percentile proponents argue that the friendship treaties attempted to
ensure equivalent national treatment, 1 and that therefore, Congress
did not intend article VIII(l) to exempt foreign businesses from United
States employment discrimination laws.l13 After all, any advantages
American businesses would realize from such a provision would also be
realized by their Japanese counterparts in the United States. Moreover,
any "absolute" right provision would result in local American businesses having to abide by anti-discrimination laws while their Japanese
competition remained exempt from such laws.
There is legislative history, however, indicating that Congress was
not very concerned about reciprocal business effects.11 ' From its vantage point in the early 1950s, Congress had no cause for concern about
Japan exercising treaty rights to its advantage. Japan had been devastated by World War II and no one imagined that Japanese companies
could invest on a large scale within the United States.""0 It was especially inconceivable that a treaty provision that gave American companies an immediate advantage in foreign countries might be used by foreign companies in the United States to create civil rights problems."
In the early 1950's, the concept of civil rights had not yet embedded
itself into the fabric of American society; the Brown v. Board of Edication'1 7 decision was handed down one year after the ratification of
the Japan Treaty. Congress could not have foreseen or been overly conHALBERSTAM, supra note 31, at 30.
See J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 817 (1980) (citing a 1952 quotation
by Charles Erwin Wilson).
112. Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at 951.
113. See id. (contending that Congress did not consider civil rights implications in
negotiating the Japan Treaty simply because there were no federal civil rights laws in
existence at that time).
114. See 1953 Report, supra note 60, at 10 (explaining that the reciprocal nature
of the Friendship Treaties would benefit American professionals more than foreign professionals simply because of the immense scale of American economic involvement in
foreign nations).
115. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (noting the post-war economic
imbalance that existed between the United States and Japan).
116. See Note, Commercial Treaties,supra note 21, at 951 (noting that there were
no federal civil rights laws concerning private employment discrimination when the
Japan Treaty was ratified).
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110.

111.
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cerned about any reciprocal civil rights effects. Instead, Congress focused on the more immediate matter of securing economic opportunity
abroad for American business." 8 Senator Hickenlooper, in his remarks
urging ratification of the Greece Treaty, stated that it was "essential
that we not view conventions simply as documents which give aliens
limited rights in this country. In fact, there are many more Americans
doing business abroad than there are aliens doing business in this country. Americans get more advantages abroad than we accord advantages

here to aliens." 119 In sum, the legislative history indicates that article
VIII(l) attempted to provide employers of the signatory countries, both

Japanese and American, with the right to choose their own nationals
for key executive positions without being subject to domestic laws of
the host country.

B.

STATE DEPARTMENT AND

MITI

INTERPRETATION

The State Department has interpreted the Japan Treaty as according

Japanese employers national treatment; that is, providing them a right
to prefer Japanese citizens for key executive positions, but subject to

the laws of the United States. 120 Although not conclusive, the State
Department's interpretation of the Treaty carries great weight with
federal courts.' 21 Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) has taken the opposite position, contending that the Japan
Treaty exempts Japanese employers from Title VII limitations. 2

MITI did not specifically analyze the Treaty's legislative history, but
stated that the "ability of Japanese investors to dispatch executive em-

ployees from Japan to manage and control their overseas subsidiaries is
of the greatest importance.' 1 23 MITI concluded that any court decision
118. See 99 CONG. REC. 9313-37 (1953) (providing the pre-vote Senate debate on
the advantages to American business that would result from passage of the Greece
Treaty).
119. Id. at 9313.
120. See Walker, supra note 59, at 232 (explaining that the national treatment
standard controlled with respect to the rights accorded foreign firms under the Friendship Treaties). Walker was the Advisor on Commercial Treaties at the State Department and was in charge of establishing the general structure of the Friendship Treaties.
Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181 n.6. See also Spiess, 643 F.2d at 370 (citing Airgram from
Secretary of State Kissinger to American embassy in Tokyo, No. A-105, Jan. 9, 1976
(discussing article VII of the Japan Treaty)). Kissinger stated that "a national or company of either party is granted national treatment to control and manage enterprises
they have established or acquired." Id.
121. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon. 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961)).
122. Amicus Brief, supra note 53, at 2.
123. Id. at 5.
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that impaired this right would prompt Japanese investors to limit their
1 24
investment in the United States.
The Supreme Court held that great weight must be given to the
meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the government agencies
charged with its negotiation and enforcement.1 28 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly instruct as such, one can reasonably assume that both interpretations are of equal weight. After all, both nations participated fully in drafting the Treaty and presumably possess
equally legitimate insights into the meaning of article VIII(l). Thus,
interpretations by either the MITI or the State Department do not help
in resolving the conflict between the Treaty and Title VII. Under these
circumstances, this Article however, abides by MITI's position and
concludes that article VIII(l) was intended to provide employers with
the right to choose their own nationals for key executive positions without subjection to the domestic laws of the host country.
IV.

TITLE VII -

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
SCOPE

Some assert that the Friendship Treaty notwithstanding, the Japanese employer's practice of hiring only Japanese nationals is discriminatory and violative of Title VII. 26 Title VII prohibits employers from
employment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. 27 Title VII does not refer to the Japan
Treaty or any other friendship treaty.1 2 Title VII also does not expressly indicate whether foreign employers doing business in the United
States come within its ambit.121 This statutory silence raises two questions: 1) does Title VII apply to foreign employers doing business in the
United States; and 2) if it does apply, does it limit the hiring practices
of the Japanese employer?
124. Id. at 5-6.
125. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 (citing Kolovrat. 366 U.S. at 194). In
Sumitomo, the Court implicitly indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the
Japanese agency responsible for interpreting the Treaty. As indicated earlier, however.
MITI has played an equally influential role in the interpretation and application of the
Treaty. For purposes of this paper, the MITI position will be deemed to be the position
of the Japanese government.
126. Id. at 178.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
128. Id.
129. See 110 CONG. REC. H2737 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1964) (statement of Rep.
Libonati) (indicating that at least one congressman viewed Title VII as applying to
foreign commerce). Rep. Libonati stated, "Title VII covers employers engaged in industries affecting commerce - interstate and foreign commerce and commerce within
the District of Columbia." Id.
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Although Title VII does not explicitly so state, its language, its underlying policies, and the social and political environment in which it
was passed support the assertion that Congress intended Title VII to
encompass all employers who do business in the United States. Title
VII was enacted at a time when blatant, pervasive discrimination was
practiced against African-Americans and other minorities in the workplace. 30° Several Congressional sponsors highlighted the debilitating effects of discrimination on the individual employee and on industry.
Senator Humphrey, one of the sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
emphasized that, apart from moral concerns, full participation in the
workplace through the prevention of discrimination would assure
America's continued industrial strength."'
Title VII defines an employer as a person involved in an industry
affecting commerce who employs fifteen or more employees.' Under
this broad definition, the duties imposed by the Act attach once the
basic threshold of fifteen or more employees is reached.' 33 Such broad
definitional language, enacted at a time of widespread discrimination,
strongly suggests that Title VII applies to foreign employers doing business in this country. No other conclusion is reasonable, given Congress'
serious concern over employment discrimination.
Further support for this position may be gathered by noting that
while the definition of "employer" does provide limited exceptions from
4
Title VII coverage, and these are explicitly set forth in the statute;'
the exceptions do not include foreign employers doing business in this
country. 3 5 In other words, Congress did not specifically exempt foreign
employers doing business in the United States from Title VII coverage,
even though it specifically exempted other categories of employers.
Moreover, when the statute was amended in 1972, several of the excep130. See B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 224 (1970) (referring

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL

to Title VII). During the Title VII debates,
Sen. Humphrey' stated, "[d]iscrimination in employment is not confined to any region-it is widespread in every part of the country. It is harmful to Negroes and to
members of other minority groups. It's also harmful to the Nation as a whole." Id.
131. See id. at 224-25 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (referring to Council of Economic Advisors' estimates that discrimination in employment cost the American economy billions of dollars).
132. Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (defining unlawful employment practices).
134. Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). The term "employer" does
not include the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the
United States, or an Indian tribe. Id. In addition, Title VII does not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any state, or to a religious
corporation, association or society. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
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tions to the definition of employer were eliminated, 36 suggesting that
Congress wished to maximize the coverage of Title VII. The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with
enforcing Title VII, reached a similar conclusion.13 7 In a comprehensive policy statement issued in 1988, the EEOC stated that "[i]t is also
significant that the Act contains no exemption from coverage for foreign employers even though Congress wrote numerous exemptions in
the original statute and its amendments." 8 In the same policy statement, the EEOC noted that following Congressional intent required extending Title VII to some foreign employers. 3 According to the
EEOC, section 2000e-1 of Title VII is consistent with the remedial
purpose of the Civil Rights Act, which aims to break down the barriers
that operated to favor certain classes of employees over others. 140 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress considered the
policy underlying Title VII to be of highest priority. 14' As a policy of
the highest priority, it would be consistent to apply Title VII to all
employers, unless specifically exempted from the Act. Here, Japanese
employers are not specifically exempted from Title VII.142 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Japanese employers fall within the
ambit of Title VII.
V.

TITLE VII -

THEORIES AND APPLICATION

Although the scope of Title VII encompasses Japanese employers, it
still remains to be determined whether the Japanese hiring practices
violate Title VII. As noted, Japanese employers have a practice of
choosing only Japanese citizens for key executive positions.' 43 At first
glance, this practice does not appear violative of Title VII which only
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and
national origin; citizenship is not a protected category.' 4' The problem
136. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
2137, 2180 (expanding the coverage of the term "employer").
137. EEOC Policy Statement, N-915.033. (New Developments), Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) § 5158, at 6433-41 (Sept. 2, 1988).
138. Id. at 6434.
139. Id.
140. Id. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (finding that the
pre-employment test given by the company did not measure job performance but rather
discriminated against blacks in the abstract).
141. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400. 402 (1968).
142. See supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text (discussing the coverage of
the term "employer").
143. See supra notes 22-54 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese hiring
practices).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
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arises when one examines the effect of hiring on the basis of citizenship
upon Title VII's protected categories.
Hiring on the basis of citizenship tends to overlap with certain protected categories, especially national origin. Citizenship refers to a legal identification with a particular country-a native or naturalized
person owing allegiance to a particular state, subject to its jurisdiction
and government, and entitled to protection from it. 45 National origin,
is generally understood to refer to the country from which an individual
or an individual's ancestors originated. 4 Both terms refer to a type of
attachment to a specific country - a legal attachment in the case of
citizenship, and an ancestral attachment in the case of national origin.
Because both terms refer to a particular country, and employment
decisions made on the basis of citizenship may discriminate against
those whose ancestors did not originate from that country. This is especially true in the case of Japan, which has a homogenous population
and a restrictive immigration policy so that few foreigners are permitted to become naturalized citizens. 147 Consequently, a Japanese-only
employment policy inevitably encompasses only Japanese citizens and
those of Japanese origin. This can result in national origin discrimination because it would affect qualified applicants whose national origin
was not Japan. Exclusion on the basis of national origin is explicitly
prohibited by Title VII.
As an aside, it is not immediately apparent that Congress intended to
include persons whose national origin is the United States. 48 Resolving
this issue is important because the majority of those who may be denied employment by Japanese employers in the United States will most
likely be those whose immediate ancestors are Americans. 40 If it is
determined that the legislature did not intend to include such persons,
then this large class of persons is precluded from bringing an action
under Title VII for national origin discrimination. The legislative history suggests that Congress intended that "national origin" be broadly
145.
146.

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 221 (5th ed. 1979).

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

924 (5th ed. 1979).

147. See Note, Yankees out of North America: Foreign Employer Job Discrimination against American Citizens, 83 MICH. L. REV. 237, 241 n.19 (1984) [hereinafter

note, Yankees] (observing that as of 1971, over 99% of Japan's population was made
up of persons of Japanese origin).
148. See 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Roosevelt) (stating that
national origin means a person's country of origin).
149. See generally D. BOGUE, THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL TRENDS AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS (1985) (examining United States population
trends). This is clear when one considers that the percentage of persons whose immediate ancestors are from the United States far outnumber first and second generation
immigrants to the United States. Id.
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construed to include members of all national groups and groups of persons of common heritage or ancestry."' Yet there is no clear evidence
that Congress intended to extend coverage to those of American national origin.
This is understandable because national origin cases involving employees of American descent would most likely arise only where a foreign employer is involved; it is doubtful that an American employer
would discriminate against applicants of American origin. As discussed
earlier, however, Congress did not expressly consider the applicability
of Title VII to the foreign employer and thus probably did not consider
whether national origin discrimination extended to those of American
national origin.1 5 This raises the issue of whether Title VII covers discriminatory practices based on American national origin. The brief response is yes - given the broad definition of national origin, the broad
policies underlying Title VII, and the broad EEOC regulations."1 2 Several courts have come to this conclusion, noting that "employment discrimination, based on one's country of birth, whether that birthplace is
the United States or elsewhere, contradicts the purpose and intent of
3
15m
Title VII.

A.

ESPINOZA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In 1973, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of overlap between
citizenship and national origin in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing
Co..1 5 Espinoza, a lawfully admitted resident alien who remained a
citizen of Mexico, applied for employment as a seamstress with Farah
Manufacturing Company (Farah).1 55 Her application was rejected on
the basis of a long standing company policy of not hiring aliens." 8 She
150. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw

305 (2d ed.

1983).

151. See supra notes 146 and 150 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning
of national origin).
152. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. Part
1606 (1990). The EEOC regulation explicitly states that the guidelines on national
origin discrimination apply to "all entities covered by Title VII (collectively referred to
as 'employer')." Id. at § 1606.2. As noted earlier, "employer" has been defined in the
Title VII context to also include foreign employers conducting business within the
United States. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). See also Lansing, supra note 50, at 160
(contending that Title VII applies to both foreign and domestic employers because it
does not distinguish one from the other).
153. Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, 798 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1986)
(citing Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig, 582 F. Supp. 669, 675 (N.D. 111.
1984)).
154. Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
155. Id. at 87.
156. Id.
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filed suit under section 703 of Title VII, 15 alleging that Farah had
discriminated against her because of her national origin. 158 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Espinoza was rejected because of
her citizenship, which the Court concluded is a different category than
national origin. 1 9 The Court determined that national origin refers to
the nation from which an individual's ancestors came and not to an
individual's legal relationship with a particular nation.'6 0 In support of
this conclusion, the Court noted the legally sanctioned policy of barring
non-citizens from certain federal government jobs, a policy which existed despite Congressional intent to forbid discrimination in Federal
employment on the basis of national origin. 6 The Court reasoned that
prohibition of non-citizens from certain federal government jobs could
be reconciled with the general prohibition against national origin discrimination only if citizenship and national origin were conceptually
different."6 2 Thus, based on the above analysis, the Court determined
that Congress did not intend for discrimination based on citizenship to
be included in Title VII.' 3
The Court, while drawing a clear distinction between citizenship and
national origin, cautioned that "there may be many situations where
discrimination on the basis of citizenship would have the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin."'' The Court stated clearly
that where the purpose or effect of the employer action is to discriminate on the basis of national origin, such action is prohibited by Title
VII. 65 Because national origin and citizenship are closely connected, it
is possible that a Japanese employer who hires on the basis of citizenship effectively discriminates on the basis of national origin. To determine whether there is such an effect, we turn to various Title VII
theories.
B.

DISPARATE TREATMENT

Disparate treatment refers to the employer practice of treating some
people less favorably than others due to their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.' Demonstrating disparate treatment involves prov157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
158.

Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 87.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 89-91.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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ing a discriminatory motive, which may be accomplished through comparative evidence."" 7 In the typical disparate treatment case, the plaintiff employee must initially establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.1 68 The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant employer, who must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection.""6 " If the employer accomplishes this, then

the burden of proof shifts back to the employee, who must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's supposedly legiti-

mate, nondiscriminatory reason was actually a pretext for intentional
17 0
discrimination.
The Japanese practice of hiring key executives on the basis of citizenship is discriminatory under the disparate treatment theory. It is
relatively easy to demonstrate that selection on such a basis is a pretext

for national origin discrimination . 7 1 The Japanese employer values not
citizenship per se, but more the cultural values and business knowledge
believed to be associated with citizenship. 72 The rejected applicant can
argue that citizenship is a subterfuge which assures that the Japanese
employer select only candidates of Japanese national origin. 173 Thus,
the Japanese employer's explanation that the hiring selections were
based on Japanese citizenship is likely to be viewed as false.'17

Some courts have held that even if an employer's asserted basis for
its actions is proven false, the complainant must also prove that the

asserted basis is a pretext for discrimination. 17" These courts have rea167. Id.
168. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). This means
the plaintiff employee must show that: (1)he or she is a member of a protected class(2) he or she was qualified for the position; (3) he or she was rejected despite his or her
qualifications; and (4) that the position remained unfilled and the employer continued
to look at applicants with similar qualifications. Id.
169. Id. at 802.
170. Id. at 804.
171. See note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 241 (observing that requiring an employee to possess extensive familiarity with Japanese business and cultural values may
be tantamount to national origin discrimination). The EEOC has acknowledged this,
determining that national origin discrimination meant those practices premised on
"cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1
(1983).
172. Note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 241.
173. See id. (observing that because of Japan's homogenous population, those with
the necessary understanding of Japanese culture either in Japan or America are almost
inevitably of Japanese national origin).
174. Id.
175. See Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837 F.2d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that a
claimant may prove an employer's pretext for discrimination by demonstrating that the
employer's reasons are unworthy of belief). See also White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037.
1042-43 (1st Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984) (acknowledging the required
showing of pretext consists of proof that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
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soned that the additional showing is necessary because the employee

retains the burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent throughout
the case.176 Under these circumstances, Japanese employers can con-

ceivably argue that their non-Japanese employees have not demonstrated that Japanese citizenship is a pretext for national origin discrimination. In other words, while citizenship may not be the desired
employment qualification, the employee may not be able to demon-

strate that it is a pretext for national origin discrimination.
This argument, however, may not be particularly successful. First, a
number of federal circuits have rejected the additional requirement and
have held instead that discrimination can be found once the employer's
asserted basis is proven false.1 7 Second, if a Japanese employer consid-

ers only Japanese nationals for employment, then it would not be difficult to demonstrate discriminatory intent because if the employer's objective is to obtain the best qualified person, then it is not clear why all
non-Japanese applicants are automatically precluded from consideration. The employer's action appears even more discriminatory when the

court considers that the Japanese have historically had a strong
prejudice against non-Japanese. 1 8 Thus, a Japanese employer who attempts to raise the "citizenship" defense against a claim of disparate

treatment may find it difficult to dodge a finding of national origin
discrimination.
A Japanese employer's best strategy with respect to successfully defending its hiring and employment practices is to demonstrate that the

selected candidate was chosen not on the basis of citizenship, but instead on the basis of his or her knowledge of Japanese culture and busi-

ness practices. This can avoid a finding of intentional discrimination
because it focuses on the unique and specific qualifications necessary to
be a key executive in a Japanese company. Under this strategy, a Japawere not sincere, but were instead only a pretext for discrimination); Mason v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the
plaintiff should have presented evidence to establish that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the employer was pretextual).
176. White, 732 F.2d at 1042-43.
177. See Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464 (2d Cir. 1989)
(dismissing the appellant's federal claims on the ground that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination); Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715,
726 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that once plaintiff meets his or her burden of showing that
the defendant employer's asserted reasons are pretextual, then the jury may infer that
the defendant employer's decision was motivated by race); Sims v. Cleland, 813 F.2d
790. 793 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that the falsity of the articulated reason is not the
onlv basis for finding it pretextual).
178. See Cole, supra note 56, at 9 (noting that Honda of America Manufacturing
settled a federal discrimination complaint with 370 non-Japanese workers for six million dollars in 1988).
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nese employer can hire employees based on an ostensibly legitimate,

non-discriminatory factor - familiarity with Japanese business practices and cultural values. 1 9 Then, even if the employees selected are
Japanese citizens or those of Japanese origin, the employer has not ac-

ted discriminatorily under Title VII because it hired the candidate on
the basis of legitimate qualifications.

This strategy requires Japanese employers to develop specific hiring
criteria that will inevitably encompass some persons not of Japanese
origin, while making Japanese candidates significantly more likely to

meet requirements.18 These criteria could include: (1) language fluency, (2) understanding of and experience with Japanese management

and business practices, and (3) understanding of Japanese culture.18 '
Japanese employers will have to demonstrate that their employment decisions legitimately require consideration of such criteria. This may
create difficulties because it may not be easy to demonstrate that core
Japanese values are a necessary requirement for the position. In some

cases, while an applicant may have had some exposure to cultural values, the Japanese employer may question whether the applicant will
apply those values in the same manner as a Japanese employee. Having

an intellectual grasp of a concept or practice does not guarantee that
those concepts will be put into practice in a manner consistent with

Japanese culture. Although such reasoning may be theoretically justified, actions based on such concerns may be deemed by courts to be a
pretext for discrimination.
179. See Note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 241-42 (making the argument that a
cultural and business familiarity requirement does not represent national origin discrimination). American courts interpretation of "national origin" may be construed as
narrow to the point of not including cultural characteristics. Id.
180. See id. at 242 (arguing for a business and cultural familiarity requirement).
The EEOC prohibits employment practices that discriminate on the basis of cultural or
linguistic characteristics. Id., citing 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1983). The EEOC's focus
with respect to national origin discrimination appears to be on immutable characteristics that cannot be acquired by those outside the group. Yankees, supra note 149, at
242. A cultural and business familiarity requirement falls outside the ambit of the
EEOC's policy because it does not demand that a person be born in Japan in order to
meet the test. Id.
181. See Avagliano, 638 F.2d at 552 (considering applicability of Title VII). The
Second Circuit suggested that, in consideration of the unique needs of a Japanese firm
conducting business in America, the following factors be given credence: (I) Japanese
fluency skills; (2) understanding of Japanese goods, markets, customs, and business
methods; (3) familiarity with the persons and operations vis-a-vis the Japanese parentand (4) a sound relationship with those persons with whom the subsidiary or parent
conducts business. Id. at 559.
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Japanese employers should also emphasize the rigorous training
needed to meet the above criteria, 82 thus amplifying the difficulties a
person of non-Japanese origin would undergo in attempting to achieve
them. The employer may wish to highlight that future Japanese executives, who already have the advantage of being born into the Japanese
culture, must nevertheless undergo rigorous ten-year training programs
where they become familiar with the monetary systems, culture, and
products of the countries with which they trade. The employer bears
the burden of convincing the trier of fact that such a mix of culture
and training is fundamental to key executive positions.
Japanese employers should adopt qualifications-oriented employment
policies that do not expressly refer to citizenship. This "qualifications"
approach avoids reliance upon an overly broad classification (such as
citizenship) that could be construed as a pretextual reason for intentional discrimination. At the same time, it permits Japanese employers
to hire employees who possess the characteristics and qualifications required by the position. In short, the "qualifications" approach is nondiscriminatory.

C.

BFOQ EXCEPTION

A Japanese employer can defend an employment policy premised on
national origin under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
exception. 1 83 The BFOQ exception allows intentional discrimination on
the grounds of religion, sex, or national origin, if the discriminatory
practice is "reasonably necessary" to the regular conduct of the employer's business. 84 The exception is expressly permitted by Title
VII.1 85
The BFOQ exception thus permits an employer to make employment
decisions on the basis of what would normally be considered discriminatory criteria. For example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 86 the Supreme
Court held that the BFOQ exception permitted the, employer to consider only males for the position of prison guard in maximum security
prisons.' The Alabama Board of Corrections denied a woman employ182. See Lansing, supra note 50, at 166-67 (discussing the extensive training executives undergo in Japan's trading companies); Note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 251
(noting that the average Japanese trading executive goes through a ten year training
program).
183.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (1988). See also supra notes 12-14 and accompany-

ing text (describing the BFOQ defense).
184.
185.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (1988).

186.

433 U.S. 321 (1977).

187.

Id. at 324.
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ment as a prison guard.1 88 The Board justified its denial, in part, on the

basis of a state regulation which required male prison guards in maximum security facilities. 1 89 The Court found that the state regulation
was encompassed by the BFOQ exception and found that Alabama's
male maximum security prisons were such violent and disorganized
places that using women as guards would endanger prison security.19 0

The Court reasoned that "where a substantial portion of the inmate
population is composed of sex offenders mixed at random with other
prisoners, there are few visible deterrents to inmate assaults on women
custodians.""9 " The Court justified a BFOQ exception under such circumstances by indicating that placing women in such positions would
pose a real threat not only to the women, but also to the "basic control
of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates and the other security

personnel." 192 The Court concluded that "[t]he employee's very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the

security that is the essence of a [prison guard's] responsibility" and
that therefore, the "male guards only""

3

regulation was justified.""

Japanese companies wishing to use the BFOQ exception should note
that it is generally narrowly interpreted by American courts' 90 and the
EEOC. 196 Courts that narrowly construe the BFOQ exception apply it
only when the "essence of the business operation" would be hurt
188. Id. at 323. Rawlinson was denied a position as correctional counselor trainee
because she did not meet the statutory minimum height and weight requirement. Id. at
323-24. The Court found that such requirements had a discriminatory impact on female applicants. Id. at 332.
189. Id. at 332 n.16.
190. See id. at 334-37 (describing conditions in Alabama's male maximum security
prisons). Alabama's male maximum security prisons aggregated prisoners without regard to seriousness of offense. Id. at 335.
191. Id. at 335-36.
192. Id. at 336.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 334. See also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th
Cir. 1971) (noting that EEOC guidelines required the BFOQ exception to be narrowly
construed), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co..
408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (denouncing broad interpretation of the BFOQ
defense).
Supporters of a broad interpretation of the BFOQ exception cite Sumitomo. 457
U.S. 176. In Sumitomo, the Court suggested that the BFOQ defense may be legitimately invoked by a Japanese employer when -[there is little doubt that some positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the U.S. call for great familiarity with not only the language but also the culture, customs, and business practices of
that country." Id. at 189 n.19. The Court, however, did not specifically address the
BFOQ issue in Sumitomo. Id.
196. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a), 1606.1 (1977) (noted in Note, Commercial Treaties,
supra note 21, at 968-69, n.1 10).
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through compliance with Title VII. 19 7 Other courts have applied the
BFOQ defense when there is a reasonable, factual cause to believe that
all or substantially all of the members of the discriminated class would
be unable to perform their work safely and efficiently, or when it would
be extremely impractical to deal with the protected class on an individual basis.198 Only in these limited situations may the employer make
employment decisions that discriminate against persons protected
under Title VII.
The Second Circuit broke from this restrictive approach when it
fashioned a significantly different BFOQ analysis within the "foreign
employer" context.' 99 In Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji, Am., Inc., the
Second Circuit reasoned that while the BFOQ exception is normally
construed very narrowly, as pertaining to a Japanese firm enjoying
rights under Article VIII of the Treaty, it must be interpreted in a way
that gives proper weight to the Treaty rights and special needs of a
Japanese firm conducting business in the United States.2 0
This more expansive application of the BFOQ defense was not adequately justified by the Second Circuit. The court's rationale was that
only a broad construction of the BFOQ defense would appropriately
account for the Treaty rights of the Japanese employer and give due
weight to the unique requirements of a Japanese employer doing business in this country.2°0 This rationale, however, avoids the more fundamental question of why Treaty rights needed to be taken into account.
Indeed, earlier in its opinion, the Second Circuit recognized that the
Treaty phrase "of their choice" did not immunize Japanese employers
20°
from Title VII.
If the court was attempting to accomodate the potentially conflicting
provisions of the Treaty and Title VII, then it never explained why
accomodation was necessary in the first place. The court's decision
leaves the impression that because of the Treaty, accomodation is the
only possible resolution to the conflict. Yet, given the lack of reference
within Title VII to practices of foreign employers, the court possibly
197.

Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334. Pime v. Loyola Univ., 803 F.2d 351, 356 (7th Cir.

1986).
198.
199.
200.

Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980).
Avagliano, 638 F.2d at 552.
Id. at 559. The court went on to list four factors that would be relevant to

finding a BFOQ: 1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, 2) knowledge of Japanese
products, markets, customs, and business practices, 3) familiarity with the personnel
and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and 4) acceptability to
those persons with whom the company or branch does business. Id.
201.
202.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 558.
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could have concluded that employers doing business under the FCN
treaty were exempt from Title VII. Similarly, given the broad language
of Title VII and its overarching policy, the court could have possibly
concluded that Title VII was fully applicable to Japanese employers
doing business in this country. Accomodation was not a mandated
conclusion.
Moreover, the Second Circuit did not explain why it was necessary
to expand upon the traditional construction of the BFOQ defense. The
court listed "acceptability to those persons with whom the company or
branch does business" as a relevant factor supporting a BFOQ defense. 03 Client or customer preferences had been previously rejected by
other circuits as a rationale for a BFOQ. 2 " The Second Circuit never
explained why an exception could be made in this context.
On a more fundamental level, it is doubtful that a national origin
BFOQ exception, even when read narrowly, is justifiable. The BFOQ
exception is meant to accomodate essential business needs. 2 5 As discussed previously, the Supreme Court in Dothardjudged the BFOQ
defense valid on the grounds that females generally do not possess the
strength necessary to maintain prison security. 206 Thus, a relatively immutable characteristic, such as physical strength, served to validate a
BFOQ defense.
A national origin BFOQ exception in this instance rests upon the
assumption that only those of Japanese origin possess the requisite
knowledge and understanding of Japanese business practices and cultural values, and that this knowledge and understanding cannot be obtained by non-Japanese persons.207 This iis a national origin stereotype
because it relies upon "factually unsupportable assumptions that all
people of a particular national origin have acquired a particular trait,
character, or ability by virtue of their national origin and its concomitant culture." 208 Unlike in Dothard, this BFOQ exception does not depend upon immutable characteristics. It is difficult, but not impossible,
for a non-Japanese person to obtain sufficient knowledge and understanding of Japanese business practices and cultural values. It is diffi203. Id. at 559.
204. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1981).
205. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386.
206. Dothard, 443 U.S. at 334-37 (1977).
207. See Note, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent CorporationRights Under
Commercial Treaties to Hire Employees "of Their Choice". 86 COLUM. L. REv. 139,
165 (1986) (analyzing what is needed to mount a successful BFOQ defense).
208. Gray, The National Origin BFOQ under Title VII: Limiting the Scope of the
Exception, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 311, 314 (1985) [hereinafter Gray].
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cult, if not impossible, to prove that no non-Japanese businessperson
possesses such knowledge and understanding. 20 9 National origin is not a
short-cut to describing an applicant's knowledge of Japanese culture
and business practices. There is theoretically nothing that prevents a
class of non-Japanese persons from acquiring the requisite knowledge
of Japanese customs and practices. Unlike strength, looks, and other
physical characteristics, knowledge and experience of Japanese culture
may be acquired by a class of non-Japanese persons.
Formulating a national origin classification on the basis of knowledge
of and exposure to Japanese culture is unlike a gender based classification of size, weight, and strength. A gender classification is a legitimate
short-cut for describing differences in strength and other physical characteristics. These physical characteristics are generally understood to
be beyond the control of the class endowed with those characteristics.
For example, it is conventionally acknowledged that females as a class
cannot raise their strength level 2 10 so as to be indistinguishable from
males.2 1' The same degree of predictability, however, does not exist for
national origin classifications. Being of Japanese national origin is not
dispositive of whether a person possesses the requisite knowledge to
hold a key executive position.
Some may emphasize the historically closed nature of Japanese society and the substantial differences between Japanese and American
culture in order to show the many practical impediments justifying a
BFOQ exception. 212 Such practical reasons, however, merely highlight
the difficulty of obtaining such knowledge rather than demonstrating
the impossibility of acquiring the necessary experience and information. Mere difficulty in acquiring the characteristics of a certain class,
cannot be an adequate justification for a BFOQ exception. Indeed, to
accept the "closed nature of Japanese society" as a basis for a BFOQ
exception would be to allow the Japanese to stress the xenophobic aspects of their culture and to legitimize national origin discrimination.
209.

Id. at 315.
210. See N.Y. Times, July 21, 1991, Section 4 at 3 (discussing the arguments for
and against sending women into combat). Some argue that gender differences such as
strength are not genetic differences, but instead are a culturally conditioned difference.
211. See Women and Superiority, Washington Post, June 21, 1991, at C3 (noting
that in a culture where strength is worshipped, a strong belief that men are the superior
sex prevails). Furthermore, societal expectations of women may prevent them from engaging in activities and events which would promote strength. Id.
212. See The Independent, Oct. 6, 1990 at 33 (stating that Naomi Wolf, in her
book The Beauty Myth, supports the position that social expectations of beauty prevent
women from obtaining self worth).
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Moreover, Japan's increased economic activity and investment in the
United States has resulted in many Americans receiving significant exposure to Japanese business practices and cultural values. 13 Many
American companies have in fact instituted Japanese-influenced labor
and management policies.21' In this context, it cannot be argued that
Americans are completely incapable of obtaining a sufficient understanding of Japanese business practices and cultural values.
Instead of relying on the BFOQ defense, the Japanese employer is
advised to focus instead on an employment policy premised on actual
employment qualifications approach would best serve Japanese employers. The qualifications approach, with its focus on knowledge of Japanese business and culture, avoids excluding qualified non-Japanese persons. 215 National origin would cease to be an issue and Japanese
companies could be assured that they are hiring from a qualified pool
of applicants. Whether the criteria at issue serves essential business
needs is the ultimate focus with respect to either a national origin
BFOQ or the qualifications approach. As explained earlier, however,
this is a difficult burden for a national origin BFOQ to meet.
D.

DISPARATE IMPACT

Japanese employers who make employment decisions on the basis of
citizenship may also be vulnerable under Title VII's disparate impact
analysis. Disparate impact analysis was first developed by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 216 In Griggs, the employer required
all successful applicants for certain jobs to have either a high school
education or to have passed a general intelligence test.217 These requirements operated to disqualify black applicants at a substantially
213. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining the widespread involvement of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States). See also Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 622-23 (noting how Honda implemented Japanesestyle labor practices at its Marysville, Ohio plant).
214. See Comment, Japanese Labor Relations, supra note 22, at 606-07 (describing Japanese influence on American companies). Over 200 American firms had
adopted quality control circles by 1981. Id. at 606. Motorola implemented a Participative Management Program that stresses employee participation, communication, and
trust as a way to increase product quality and worker productivity. Id. at 607. Westinghouse Corporation examined the possibility of implementing Theory Z management
techniques, which emphasize quality control, employee input, and consensus. Id.
215. See Note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 249-53 (arguing for a BFOQ based on
business and cultural familiarity).
216. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
217. Id. at 425-46.
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higher rate than white applicants.21 8 The Supreme Court concluded

that neither requirement was significantly related to successful job performance.21 9 On this basis, the Court held that facially neutral employ-

ment practices, which are not job-related and which have a discriminatory impact on protected groups, are violative of Title VII. 22 °

Furthermore, the Court established that an employer could violate Title VII even when acting in complete good faith and without any discriminatory intent.221

A citizenship-based hiring requirement, while arguably facially neu-

tral,22 2 clearly disqualifies persons of non-Japanese origin. Because Ja-

pan is largely homogeneous,

23

any employment policy that requires

Japanese citizenship excludes individuals, at the very least, on the pro-

tected classes under Title VII of race, color, and national origin. 2 4
Under Griggs, the Japanese employer must show that the citizenship

requirement is significantly job-related in order to justify disparate impact.22 5 Citizenship is similar to national origin in that it is an overly
broad classification that focuses on how an applicant obtained his or
her skills instead of whether the applicant actually possesses the
2 26
skills.

This argument however fails to address the impact of such a qualification on potentially qualified non-Japanese citizens. There is no justification for the citizenship qualification, unless the Japanese employer is

prepared to demonstrate that the great majority of non-Japanese citizens do not possess, and cannot in the future possess, those essential
cultural values. To otherwise permit such a qualification would be to
permit the Japanese employer, without having to carefully examine the
actual qualifications each candidate possesses, to erroneously and discriminatorily view all non-Japanese as lacking certain job require218. Id. at 430 n.6. The Court observed that only 12% of black males had completed high school in North Carolina versus 34% of white males. Id. In regard to the
intelligence tests used by the company, 58% of whites passed the tests while only 6%
of blacks did so. Id.
219. Id. at 429-30.
220. Id. at 431, 436.
221. Id. at 432.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1988) (making no mention of citizenship as a
protected category). See also Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95 (holding that refusing to hire
persons because of their noncitizenship status does not represent discrimination on the
ground of national origin under Title VII).
223. See Note, Yankees, supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining that as
of 1971, 99% of Japan's population consisted of persons of Japanese origin).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1988).
225. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
226. See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text (explaining why a national
origin BFOQ cannot succeed).
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ments. Viewing large groups of persons in such an abstract way is precisely what Congress intended to eliminate when it enacted Title VII.
As the Supreme Court observed, "[w]hat Congress has commanded is
that any test used must measure the person for the job and not the
1 7 Automatically excluding all members of a
person in the abstract."22
protected class is precisely what Congress attempted to eliminate
through the enactment of Title VII. 228 Under these circumstances, it is
difficult to demonstrate that citizenship is significantly job-related.
This analysis is not significantly altered by the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.229 Prior to Wards Cove,
complainants/employees could make out a prima facie case by presenting statistical evidence that demonstrated that certain employer practices disparately impacted members of a protected class.2 30 The employer then had the burden of proving that the disputed practice was a
business necessity.23' Wards Cove drastically changed this situation, requiring the employee "to isolate and identify the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. '232 This additional requirement places the heavy burden of
proving strict causation on the employee. Wards Cove also lessened the
employer's burden of proof, permitting it to defend its practices on the
basis that the challenged practice is reasonably related to the em233
ployer's business.
This marked change in disparate impact analysis will not be of significant help to the Japanese employer. It is not reasonable to require
applicants to be Japanese citizens when such a requirement would exclude a large pool of potentially qualified candidates. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it is extremely difficult to connect citizenship status with
234
the requisite knowledge necessary to work in a Japanese company.
Therefore, even under Wards Cove, Japanese companies that make employment decisions on the basis of citizenship violate Title VII.
227. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (noting that by enacting Title VII Congress made
job qualifications the compelling factor so as to force race, religion and sex to become
irrelevant).
228. Id.
229. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
230. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 (1977) (stating that statistical proof by itself
can establish a prima facie case); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States. 433 U.S.
299, 307-08 (1977) (stating the same).
231. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
232. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. A prima facie Title VII case is not made out
simply with a showing that there is a racial imbalance in the work force. Id.
233. Id. at 659. The Court stated that employers do not have to show that the
challenged practice is essential. Id.
234. Gray, supra note 208, at 314-15.
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The Third Circuit avoided reaching such a conclusion in
MacNanara v. Korean Air Lines.235 In MacNamara,an American district sales manager for Korean Airlines sued the airline for race and
national origin discrimination after it dismissed and replaced him with
a Korean national.2 38 The airline claimed that its actions were exempt
from Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes because of the
United States-Korea Friendship Treaty (Korea Treaty), which provides
that Korean employers doing business in the United States may employ
specialists of their own choosing.237 The Third Circuit studied the
Treaty's legislative history and concluded that article VIII, the "specialist of their choice" provision, was meant to exempt companies only
from local percentile laws.238 The court found that the Korea Treaty
did not exempt Korean companies from any other United States law
and therefore, Korean companies doing business in the United States
239
were subject to Title VII.
The Third Circuit, however, refused to apply a Title VII disparate
impact analysis to determine whether the airline's practices were discriminatory. 2 0 The court observed that disparate impact analysis is
mainly an exercise in demonstrating statistical disparities, and concluded that foreign companies from nations with homogenous populations are unfairly susceptible to statistical disparities which suggest
24
discrimination . 1
When a foreign company requires that its employees be citizens of
its home country, it follows that almost all of its employees will be of
the same national origin and race. Thus, a foreign employer from a
racially homogeneous nation can violate a Title VII disparate impact
analysis simply by hiring its own nationals or citizens.242 In Japan's and
Korea's cases, simply exercising their article VIII(l) rights with re235. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1135. Although MacNamara involved the KoreaUnited States Friendship Treaty, the court's analysis is relevant because the Korea
Treaty has the same employer choice provision as contained in the Japan Treaty. See
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States- Korea,
art. VIII(l), 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 [hereinafter Korea Treaty] (providing that companies are permitted to employ "accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents, and other specialists of their choice").
Furthermore, when the court conducted its disparate impact analysis, it relied heavily
on the fact that Korea's population (like Japan's) is homogenous. MacNamara, 863
F.2d at 1148.
236. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1137-38.
237. Korea Treaty, supra note 235, art. VIII(l), 8 U.S.T. at 2223.
238. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1142-46.
239. Id. at 1146-47.
240. Id. at 1147-48.
241. Id.at 1148.
242. Id.
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spect to hiring key employees would result in a Title VII violation

under a disparate impact analysis. 2 3 The Third Circuit found this an
unfair result and consequently declined to apply a disparate impact
analysis.244
The Third Circuit's concerns are misplaced, especially after Wards

Cove. The court is mistaken in its claim that a disparate impact case
can be proven solely by demonstrating statistical disparity. Prior to

Wards Cove, a disparate impact case could be established only if, after
the employee demonstrated statistical disparity, the employer was unable to identify the practices that made for the disparity and unable to

justify the practices as job-related. 24 After Wards Cove, however, to
establish a disparate impact case, in addition to demonstrating statistical disparity, an employee must also identify the specific policy and
practices that create the discriminatory impact.246 Even then, the employer has an opportunity to demonstrate that the policy is reasonably

related to employment.

47

In both instances, statistical disparity is not enough to trigger a find-

ing of disparate impact. There must also be a finding that the rule or
policy which makes for the statistical disparity is not a legitimate busi-

ness reason. Therefore, despite statistics which suggest discrimination,
the employer has a legitimate opportunity to prevail. Indeed, after
Ward's Cove, the employer need only prove that its policy is reasonably 248 justified by the business in order to prevail. The Third Circuit
erred in concluding that disparate impact theory would result in unfair

findings against certain foreign companies, and therefore, should not be
applied across the board. To the contrary, disparate impact theory,
243. Id. The Third Circuit was not concerned about finding discrimination under a
disparate treatment analysis because liability could not be imposed without first finding
that the employer intended to discriminate. Id. at 1145-47.
244. Id. at 1148.
245. Powers v. Alabama Dept. of Education, 854 F.2d 1285, 1293 (11 th Cir. 1988)
(holding that once an employee demonstrates a statistically significant disparity, the
burden of proof shifts to the employer).
246. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (1989).
247. Id. at 659.
248. The Court in Wards Cove never expressly used the term "reasonable." Instead, it stated:
The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification
for his use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstantial justification in this
regard will not suffice ....

At the same time, though, there is no requirement

that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business for it to pass muster.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. A fair summation of these sentences is that the employer must present evidence which shows that the policy is reasonablyjustified by the
business.
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which requires the employer to remove artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment,249 is fully applicable in the foreign employer context.
In sum, under both the disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories, the practice of hiring only Japanese nationals violates Title
VII. A Japanese employer should define the qualifications necessary for
the position, and then hire qualified applicants. This avoids liability
under both the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories,
while providing the employer with qualified employees.
VI.

RULES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION BETWEEN
TREATY AND TITLE VII

Clear conflict thus arises between the Japan Treaty, which permits
the Japanese employer to select employees of its choice, 250 and Title
VII, which limits that right if it is based on discriminatory motive or if
it results in a discriminatory impact.251 When faced with such a conflict, the courts have attempted to accommodate as much as possible
the rights and obligations generated by both.25 2 The Second Circuit in
Avagliano resolved an apparent conflict by holding that in the case of a
Japanese company asserting its rights under the Japan Treaty, the
proper approach is to expand the traditionally narrow BFOQ exception
set forth in Title VII.253 The Third Circuit, in MacNamara, applied a
different form of accommodation, finding that Title VII prevailed
under a disparate treatment/intentional discrimination analysis but
that the Korea Treaty prevailed in disparate impact/unintentional dis254
crimination analysis.
In attempting to accommodate article VIII(l) and Title VII in the
face of an apparent conflict, these and other courts have followed the
Supreme Court's maxim that "an act of congress [sic] ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains ....-261 Here there is a conflict, but as demon249. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
250. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text (describing the protections
provided by the Japan Treaty).
251. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting that Title VII mandates
that the employer's choice not result in a discriminatory effect).
252. See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text (describing the conflict between Title VII and the Korea-United States Friendship Treaty).
253. Avagliano, 638 F.2d at 559.
254. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146-47 nn.14-15.
255. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 117-18 (1804). See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-31 (1982) (examining international law to determine
the meaning of the word "treaty" as used in an Act of Congress).
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strated, the forms of accommodation fashioned by the Second and
Third Circuits are unsatisfactory. Section V of this Article offers a better solution by suggesting that a Japanese employer enumerate its hiring criteria and then have such criteria analyzed to determine if they
are relevant to the job at issue. Title VII does not prohibit employment
decisions made on the basis of relevant job qualifications, and the nature of many of the qualifications are such that all or substantially all
non-Japanese persons will be unable to meet them.2"' This approach
avoids the legally unjustifiable terrain of the national origin BFOQ defense and disparate treatment/disparate impact theory, while permitting the Japanese employer to select from among qualified applicants.
If, however, a court concludes that no such accommodation is possible, then a true conflict exists. American courts have developed two
mutually exclusive approaches to such a situation. One approach,
termed the Doctrine of Implied Repeal, holds that when a clear conflict
exists between a treaty and a federal statute, the most recently enacted
or ratified one takes precedence.257 Under this approach, because Title
VII was enacted in 1964, eleven years after the Japan Treaty, Title VII
controls. The other approach employed by American courts is that the
subsequently enacted federal statute supersedes a treaty only if Congress intended to override the treaty.258 Under this clear intent approach, the Treaty controls because Title VII is silent with respect to
the rights of Japanese employers who make employment choices pursuant to the Treaty.
The clear intent approach is the more justifiable approach. The Doctrine of Implied Repeal applies a per se rule to find that the later en256. See Sethi, supra note 32, at 519 (detailing how to successfully establish a
BFOQ defense). Foreign employers should precisely define the required job characteristics that a foreign national would possess. Id. This BFOQ defense should thus be
employed only with respect to senior executives in overseas affiliates and temporary

specialized positions. Id.
257. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that state
law supercedes a treaty previously entered into with Hawaii); Vorhees v. Fischer &
Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that when a treaty conflicts with an Act
of Congress, the latter in time prevails); United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490. 542
(D. N.J. 1978) (affirming that conflicts between treaties and Acts of Congress are resolved by the doctrine of implied repeal).
258. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102. 120 (1933) (holding that a
statute will not modify a prior treaty unless "such purpose on the part of Congress has
been clearly expressed"); McCulloch v. Societad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 21-22, (1963) (concluding that an Act of Congress will not supercede a
treaty unless Congress' intention is clearly expressed); MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146
(agreeing with the above); Spiess, 643 F.2d at 356 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "only
when Congress clearly intends to depart from the obligations of a treaty will inconsistent federal legislation govern").
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actment controls. This approach never entertains the possibility that
Congress may have intended for the earlier enactment to remain as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the later enactment. Ignoring
Congressional intent is problematic insofar as dealing with treaties,
which are generally the product of careful negotiations between two
sovereign nations. In such instances, courts should exercise caution and
first determine that Congress affirmatively intended to preempt an international treaty.25 9 The Doctrine of Implied Repeal does not permit
such flexibility, and therefore, the clear intent approach is preferable.
Under the clear intent approach, assuming that there is an actual conflict between article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty and Title VII, then
the Treaty controls and the Japanese employer may hire Japanese nationals even though the effect of such a practice violates Title VII.
VII.

EQUAL PROTECTION

To avoid such an outcome, employees who allege employment discrimination may claim that their Japanese employer's actions violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 0 The
Equal Protection Clause requires the federal government to treat those
who are similarly situated in an equal manner." 1 An equal protection
argument might emphasize that the United States, through article
VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty, provided Japanese employers with a legal
means by which to classify employment eligibility on the basis of citizenship or national origin. Providing the Japanese employer the legal
authority to so condition eligibility for certain positions is arbitrary and
has no relation to any compelling or important state interest. In short,
the United States, in creating such a legal basis, has denied non-Japanese employees equal protection.
The equal protection argument has two great advantages for those
alleging employment discrimination by Japanese employers. First, the
Constitution, as the supreme law of the United States, takes precedence over any inconsistent treaty.2 62 Part of the complication in analyzing the conflict between Title VII and the Japan Treaty is that because both were ratified by the federal legislature, both have equal
259. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957). See also
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21-22 (supporting Benz).
260. See infra notes 260-276 (explaining the historical development of the equal
protection claim).
261. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Supreme Court has applied the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government, finding it impliedly incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
262. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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legislative authority. The authority of the Treaty is not clearly superior
to the statute, and resolution of any conflict between the two must be
resolved by the conflict rules described in section VI. By contrast, any
conflict between the Constitution and the Treaty will have only one,
very predictable outcome - the Constitution will clearly prevail.
Second, while all persons are entitled to equal protection under the
law, equal protection jurisprudence has developed in such a way that
special constitutional protection is extended to many of the same
groups protected under Title VII. Specifically, classifications based on
race, national origin, and alienage are given special protection by requiring that the government demonstrate a compelling state interest as
justification for the grant or denial of benefits based on such classification.263 Similarly, special protection is extended to gender classification
by requiring that the state demonstrate a substantial relationship between the classification and the state interest before granting or denying benefits.2 " Here, the United States ratified the Japan Treaty and
arguably placed its imprimatur on Japanese national origin and/or citizenship-based hiring practices. Applicants rejected under this criteria
can claim that there is no justification for such action and that it constitutes denial of equal protection of the laws, thereby triggering significant constitutional protection.
Despite these advantages, an equal protection argument is probably
not viable because of the difficulty in demonstrating state action. The
Equal Protection Clause protects individual rights only with respect to
state and federal government action. 2 5 Any constitutional argument
must therefore first determine that the proscribed activity involved
state action. Here, the argument is that the United States encouraged
employment discrimination when it ratified the Japan Treaty.
The Supreme Court did, at one point, give credence to such an argument. In Reitman v. Mulkey," 8' the Supreme Court affirmed a California Supreme Court decision which held a California constitutional pro263. NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 611 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter NOWAK]. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(noting that all restrictions based on race can only be justified by "pressing public
necessity"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1971) (striking down a statute that made non-citizens ineligible to receive public assistance).
264. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (invalidating a statute establishing a different drinking age for males and females); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 27883 (1979) (invalidating a state alimony statute that imposed obligations on husbands

but not wives).
265. See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (1954) (applying the Equal Protection clause to
the federal government). See also infra notes 266-276 (illustrating the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the state action requirement).
266. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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vision invalid on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-

tion.267 The provision in question, article I, section 26, prohibited the
state from denying persons the right to sell, lease, or rent their residential real property to any person they chose. 6 8 The California Supreme
Court determined that there was state action because section 26 authorized private discrimination. 2 9 The Supreme Court affirmed this

conclusion, noting that section 26 made "[t]he right to discriminate
...one of the basic policies of the [s]tate. '2 70 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that "[h]ere we are dealing with a provision
which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize,
2 71

racial discrimination in the housing market.
This expansive approach of attributing the actions of private citizens
to the state was gradually curtailed by the Court in subsequent decisions. In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 7 2 the Court held that a warehouse-

man's attempted enforcement of a lien over goods entrusted to him for
storage pursuant to a self-help provision of the New York Uniform

Commercial Code was not attributable to the state and was therefore
not state action.2 73 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned
that the state's enactment of the provision, "merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a private
sale1 274 and held that such "acquiescence" in a private action does not

make for state action.

5

The Court indicated that state action would

267. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373.
268. See id. at 372 n.2 (explaining article I, section 26 of the California
Constitution).
269. Id. at 379. The Court stated that this type of involvement in private racial
discrimination rose to an unconstitutional level. Id.
270. Id. at 381.
271. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied heavily on the findings of the California Supreme Court and justified its
reliance by noting that the state supreme court was armed with the knowledge of facts
and circumstances "concerning the passage and potential impact of sec. 26, and [was]
familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate.
...
Id.
272. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
273. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158-66. Section 7-210 of the New York Uniform
Commercial Code permitted a warehouseman's lien to be enforced through a public or
private sale of the stored goods. Id. at 151 n.1. Petitioner was threatening to sell the
respondent's goods at the time respondent brought an action in the District Court for
damages, an injunction against the sale, and a declaration that the sale was invalid
under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153.
274. Id. at 166.
275. See id. (observing that the focus of the respondent's complaint was that New
York refused to act). The Court said that this statutory refusal to act was the same as
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only be found where the state, through its laws, compelled a party to

engage in a particular action. 27 6 In reaching this conclusion, the opin-

ion never cited to Reitman, and never explained the seeming disparity

between the two cases.
Flagg Bros. signalled a clear trend away from the expansive notions
of state action outlined in Reitman. 27 7 Under Flagg Bros., finding state

action in the employment policies of Japanese employers is a difficult
task. There is no state action unless the Japan Treaty compels Japanese

employers to discriminate against non-Japanese persons. While the
Treaty permits the Japanese employer unlimited discretion in hiring
key employees,21 8 this is hardly an express order to hire only Japanese
key employees and thereby discriminate on the basis of national origin
or citizenship. Moreover, the State Department has recently interpreted
the employer choice provision in the Korea Treaty to exempt foreign
firms from percentile laws only.27 9 This further undercuts any argument a Japanese company defendant may make that the United States
encourages employment discrimination by Japanese employers.

Any employee who formulates an equal protection argument in light
of Flagg Bros. is hampered by the Court's failure to set forth the con-

siderations underlying "state action" jurisprudence. In Flagg Bros. and
other recent state action cases, the Court has failed to provide a framework for determining whether state action exists, vis-a-vis strong encouragement of private parties, in Flagg Bros. and in other modern
state action cases.280 One commentator has ascribed this failure to the
the State refusing to provide a remedy for property disputes in instances where the
statute of limitations had expired. Id.
276. Id. at 165-66. In holding that Section 7-210 did not delegate to petitioner an
exclusive prerogative of the state, the Court noted that the concept of state action
would be "intolerably broaden[ed]" if a state's property law constituted state action
even though the state did not enforce that law. Id. at 161-62 n.10.
277. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-78 (1972) (finding no
state action where a private club with a Pennsylvania liquor license refused to serve a
black customer); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354 (1974) (determining that actions of "regulated businesses, providing arguably essential goods and
services 'affected with a public interest'" were not, by themselves, state action).
278. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
279. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 6-7, MacNamara, 863 F.2d
1135, cited in Note, Friendship,Commerce and Navigation Treaties and United States
DiscriminationLaw: The Right of Branches of Foreign Companies to Hire Executives
"of Their Choice," 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 765, 781 (1989) [hereinafter Note, FCN
Treaty].
280. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 499 U.S. 179. 192
(1988) (stating that the NCAA is an independent group and its actions were not performed under color of state law); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 356-58 (determining that there
was no state action where respondent electric company, a regulated, privately-owned
utility, cut off petitioner's service).
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Court's inability to fashion a general theory of allocating private and
public responsibility.2s8 In the absence of a guiding doctrine, any state
action argument regarding Japanese companies' employment practices
is not possible.
Suggestions for a general theory of liability as groundwork for state
action analysis are beyond the scope of this Article, but certain observations are possible within the context of employment discrimination.
The Court has specifically recognized that Congress intended anti-discrimination policies to be of the highest priority.282 Thus, one can argue
that any state action theory must be flexible enough to find such action
where discrimination is committed pursuant to a statute or other legislative vehicle. Justice Marshall suggested such an approach in his dissent in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.283 The Court should be
more amenable to finding state action in this context because Congress
has clearly indicated that eliminating discrimination is of the highest
priority.
Some may argue that such a result-oriented test cannot form a principled basis for a state action theory. It must be emphasized, however,
that what is urged here is a flexibility that accounts for congressional
priorities. Requiring a party to demonstrate that the state's law compelled private action is difficult where the state is not a party. It is
disingenuous of the Court to suggest that the state may actively encourage a private party only through express orders. Private individuals
do not take their cues from express orders alone. If the Congress repealed Title VJI, that action would undoubtedly encourage private discrimination as much as any express order to discriminate. Therefore,
any state action theory must be flexible enough to encompass subtle
forms of state-encouraged discrimination.
These suggestions do not change the current status of state action
jurisprudence. An employee seeking to argue that his or her Japanese
employer violated the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate that
the Japan Treaty compels the employer to discriminate in its hiring
practices, which is not possible under Flagg Bros.284 Thus, at present,
an equal protection argument offers no help to employees seeking to
281. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1698 (2d ed. 1988).
282. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 400, 402 (1968) (indicating that bringing an action
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act helps bring about the goals that Congress considered
of the highest priority when it passed the legislation).
283. Jackson, 410 U.S. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall was bothered by the possibility that the majority's analysis might extend to businesses that refused to serve blacks, welfare recipients, and other persons. Id. at 374.
284. See supra notes 256-259 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty in
proving that the Japan Treaty involves state action).

1991]

U.S.-JAPAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

prevent their Japanese employers from hiring only those of Japanese
origin for the positions listed in article VIII(l) of the Treaty.
VIII.

THE IMPACT OF IRCA ON EMPLOYERS' SELECTION

PRACTICES
Until 1986, Japanese employers could hire on the basis of citizenship
and thereby avoid violating Title VII. 88 This situation changed, however, with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA).288 IRCA was passed to stem the flow of unauthorized
aliens into the United States28 7 and mandates civil and criminal penalties for employers who knowingly hire unauthorized aliens,288 and civil
penalties for employers who fail to comply with its employment verification procedure. 288 There was some concern
that IRCA would lead to
291
groups.
certain
against
discrimination
Consequently, Congress included an anti-discrimination provision in
IRCA, section 102(a), that is intended to prevent employment discrim21
ination against legal aliens and citizens of national minority origin.
Section 102(a) defines an unfair immigration-related employment practice to mean "discriminat[ing] against any individual (other than am
unauthorized alien) with respect to the hiring.
285. See Immigration Reform and
Stat. 3359, 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
individual on the basis of citizenship
practice and is unlawful).
286. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.

. .

of the individual for

Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603. 100
§ 1324. (6)), (1987) (explaining that hiring an
is an unfair immigrationrelated employment
3359 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of 8

U.S.C.).
287. See Comment, IRCA's Antidiscrimination Provisions: Protections Against
Hiring Discrimination in Private Employment, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 405, 405
(1988) [hereinafter Comment, IRCA's AntidiscriminationProvisions] (acknowledging
that IRCA was aimed at "economic refugees" who illegally entered the United States

to work).
288. IRCA § 101(a)(I), 100 Stat. at 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). An
employer is subject to fines between $250 and $2000 per violation. Id., 100 Stat. at
3366-67. An employer who regularly hires illegal aliens can receive criminal penalties
of up to $3000 per illegal alien hired and six months in jail. Id. at 3367-68.
289. IRCA § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3367 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). Employers who do not properly maintain the identity and authorization verification records
risk fines of up to $1000 for each employee without the verification paperwork. Id.
290. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 90, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5649, 5694. See also Comment, The Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Provision:A Modicum of Protection Against National Origin and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U. MIAM1I L. REV. 1025,
1026-27 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Unfair Immigration] (stating that minority
groups and civil rights groups were concerned that employers would discriminate
against Hispanics and other minorities out of fear of civil penalties and criminal
prosecution).
291. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
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employment . . . (A) because of such individual's national origin, or
(B) . . . because of such individual's citizenship status. ' 29 2 Section

102(a) only covers United States citizens and lawfully admitted aliens
who have filed declarations of intent to become citizens. 93 IRCA's legislative history shows that Congress was aware that Title VII did not
cover citizenship discrimination and that it wanted IRCA to resolve
that by prohibiting intentional discrimination on the basis of
29 4
citizenship.
A.

APPLICATION AND SCOPE

Section 102(a) applies to employers with four or more employees, 2 5
which undoubtedly encompasses most Japanese employers in the
United States. Yet, as with Title VII, there is a question as to whether
IRCA applies to Japanese employers who discriminate against those
who were not intended to be IRCA's primary beneficiaries. IRCA's
legislative history clearly indicates that proponents of section 102(a)
were concerned about discrimination against minority citizens such as
Hispanic-Americans who, by virtue of their phsyical and linguistic
characteristics, would not be hired or retained by their employers despite their United States citizenship.9 " IRCA, however, makes no reference to protecting white Americans. Therefore, in many instances,
Japanese employers can plausibly argue that their hiring practices are
not covered by IRCA because they do not significantly effect those racial and national minorities it intended to protect.
Moreover, section 102(a)'s language and its legislative history both
establish that it was partially intended to prohibit employers from discriminating in favor of one class of American citizens (majority) over
another class of American citizens (minority). 297 There is no suggestion
in section 102(a) or its legislative history that IRCA was intended to
address employment practices favoring non-citizens over American citi292. ICRA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
293. ICRA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374-75 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
294. H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 293, at 70.
295. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
296. See Anti-Discrimination Provision of H.R. 3080: Joint Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law and the Senate
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Robert Garcia) (concerning IRCA's detrimental impact on Hispanic-Americans). Rep. Garcia stated, "[E]mployers would run away those who appear
foreign, whether by name, race, or accent." Id.
297. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)). See
also H.R. REP. No. 682, supra note 262, at 70-71 (indicating that the term "citizenship discrimination" applies when an employer chooses between a minority citizen and
a majority citizen).
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zens. Thus, Japanese employers can argue that section 102(a) does not
apply to their hiring practices because they involve hiring non-citizens.
Despite these ambiguities, given the broad proscription against discrimination on the basis of citizenship, one can reasonably assert that
IRCA applies to discriminatory employment practices favoring Japanese nationals over Americans. Section 102(a)'s coverage of citizens
and those intending to become citizens supports this conclusion. If Congress had wanted to exclude a specific group (comprised of a very large
number of persons) from the coverage of the Act, it would surely have
done so. Arguing that section 102(a) does not apply where those discriminated against are white Americans permits an unjustified and unsupportable exception. The Supreme Court determined this to be the
case with respect to Title VII in McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation
Co., 88 which extended Title VII protection to white Americans. 291
Thus, it can be concluded that IRCA applies to discriminatory practices against all United States citizens, including white citizens.

B.

IRCA PREVAILS OvER FCN

Given that IRCA applies to Japanese employment practices in the
United States, the question then is whether the Japan Treaty shields
Japanese employers from IRCA's requirements. Under the clear intent
approach,30 0 IRCA's section 102(a) evinces an intent to repeal article
VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty, since section 102(a) prohibits citizenship
discrimination 0 ' that article VIII(l) expressly permits.30 2 Yet, IRCA
does not exempt the Japan Treaty from compliance with section
102(a).
While Congress exempted citizenship-based discrimination mandated
by existing federal and state laws, it did not provide any exemption for
laws similar to the Japan Treaty, which merely permits employment
decisions to be made on the basis of citizenship 0 3 The absence of an
298. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
299. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 290. See also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (1971)
(stating that Congress intended to proscribe discriminatory treatment or any group,
majority or minority).
300. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (explaining the clear intent
approach and why it is preferable to the doctrine of implied repeal).
301. IRCA § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1324b).
302. See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146 (determining that the Korea Treaty's employee choice provision granted Korean firms the right to favor employees or potential
employees on the basis of citizenship); Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 21, at
953 (hypothesizing that Japanese and United States Treaty negotiators likely intended
article VIII(I) to permit foreign firms to hire key employees from among their own
citizens).
303. Japan Treaty, supra note 10, art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
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exemption strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to exclude
parties acting under Japan Treaty from IRCA's coverage.
The implications of the foregoing are significant to the Japanese employer who adheres to a citizenship-based employment policy. Such a
policy is no longer legal, notwithstanding the article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty. Unlike Title VII, section 102(a) of IRCA gives employees
a legal ground upon which they can allege that they were discriminated
against by their Japanese employer on the basis of citizenship.
In light of these developments, Japanese employers wishing to avoid
claims of employment discrimination should adopt hiring policies premised on employee qualifications. 3°0 Japanese employers could still hire
Japanese citizens, provided they were the best qualified. Making such a
determination entails finding what qualifications are necessary for the
position, but this additional effort will result in creating a legally justifiable basis for employee selection. Decisions on the basis of qualifications prevents these complications while ensuring that the business
hires and retains those best able to perform the work. This will result in
a legally justifiable employment policy that avoids overtly discriminating on the basis of such Title VII grounds as race, color, and national
origin.
IX.

POLICY

To determine the proper scope and application of the Japan Treaty,
Title VII, and IRCA, it is important to consider the policies each promotes and the value of those policies to society. The Japan Treaty, ratified during the economically prosperous post-World War II years in the
United States, was intended to facilitate American participation in the
international economy. 305 Today, economic growth in the United States
hinges a great deal upon Japanese economic activity within its borders. 06 Japanese investment has meant an infusion of capital, utilization of the local labor pool, and a larger tax base.30 7 For example, Japanese investment in the United States had created 208,000 new jobs
with a payroll of almost $6 million by 1989.308
304. See supra notes 173-176 and 186-194 and accompanying text (contending
that a qualifications-based approach is the optimal grounds upon which to base an
employment policy).
305. See supra note 60 (stating the the main purpose of the treaty was to further
United States economic policy gains).
306. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (describing Japanese economic
activity in the United States).

307. Id.
308.

Note, FCN Treaty, supra note 279, at 783.
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One policy argument in favor of a broad interpretation of article
VIII(l) is that strictly enforcing anti-discrimination laws against Japanese firms doing business in the United States might discourage future
Japanese investment.30 9 As one commentator noted, insisting that the
anti-discrimination law apply despite the Japan Treaty "might discourage foreign businesses from investing in a new industry in the United
States, depriving Americans of the benefit of innovative foreign investment." 310 This argument is not supported by recent Japanese activity in
the United States. Since Sumitomo,311 which forbid foreign firms incorporated in the United States from asserting their right to hire key
employees pursuant to article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty,312 Japanese
investment in the United States has dramatically increased. 313
Regardless of the effect that strict enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws might have, the United States has an important policy interest to
protect. Title VII and IRCA both seek to prevent discrimination in the
workplace.314 The fundamental value underlying both of these laws is
that the worth of an employee must be based on qualifications relevant
to the job, and not on irrelevant criteria such as race, sex, and
citizenship. 15
Proponents of a broad interpretation of the Japan Treaty tend to
view the conflict between the Treaty and Title VII and IRCA as an
either/or choice between two antithetical policies - business interests
versus strict enforcement of civil rights.316 Even assuming that this
equation accurately captures the essence of the conflict, the FCN proponents do not present any compelling arguments for choosing business
interests over the anti-discrimination policies. The necessity of promot309. See Note, Yankees, supra note 147, at 251-52 (discussing the chilling effect
that strict enforcement of Title VII could have on Japanese direct foreign investment).
310. Interestingly, the commentator notes that since the Supreme Court in
Sumitomo held that foreign companies incorporated in the United States may not assert FCN rights, Japanese investment in the United States has increased considerably.
This increase occurred even though the majority of Japanese companies doing business
are subsidiaries incorporated in the United States, and therefore directly affected by
the Sumitomo decision. This empirical evidence suggests that those who argue that the
Japan Treaty must prevail over the anti-discrimination laws, in order not to discourage
Japanese investment, are wrong. Note, supra at note 111.
311. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
312. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 183-84.
313. Note, FCN Treaty, supra note 279, at 783 n.1 11.
314. IRCA § 102 (a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)). See
supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying but not explicit purpose of Title VII).
315. Id.
316. See supra notes 55-125 (illustrating the various interpretations of the conflict
between the Japan Treaty and Title VII).
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ing and preserving business interests is not enough. Indeed, in the legislative debate that preceded passage of Title VII, opponents of Title VII
repeatedly used those reasons to argue against passage of the provision.
Those arguments proved to be unpersuasive when viewed against the
reality of pervasive discrimination in the workplace. True, a reasonable
argument can be made that discrimination is not as widespread as it
was in the fifties and sixties.3 17 It can also be reasonably argued that
America's economy is not the dominant force it used to be in the sixties, and that therefore, more effort should be made to strengthen and
preserve American business interests. These, however, are not compelling reasons for completely exempting Japanese employers from the
limitations of Title VII. At best, these reasons argue for a measured
adjustment of burdens of proof and theories of discrimination. It does
not argue for a wholesale exemption from the policies of anti-discrimination. Discrimination in the workplace remains a serious problem. 318
As such, business interests should argue to adjust the burdens of proof
set forth in various theories of discrimination rather than advocating
exempting Japanese employers conducting business in the United
States from Title VII or IRCA.
The either business or civil rights scenario overlooks the fact that a
qualifications-based approach offers the best of both worlds. It avoids
discriminatory classifications such as race, sex, and national origin,
while at the same time, assuring the employer that it will be hiring
from a pool of qualified applicants. Adhering to a qualifications-based
employment policy also promotes community harmony and fosters good
will. Title VII and IRCA assume greater importance as more minorities and women join the workforce, making discrimination even more
obvious. An employer who engages in discriminatory employment risks
multiple lawsuits and a bad reputation in the community. Japanese em317. Contradicting this argument is a recent poll commissioned by the National
Law Journal and the legal information service Lexis. It shows that fifty-one percent of
Americans believe that "all or most" employers practice some form of discrimination in
hiring or promotions. Most Employees Believe Employers Practice Discrimination,
Poll Shows, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 134, at A-8 (July 12, 1990). Although this is
not proof of discrimination, it does indicate that most Americans believe that discrimination continues to be a widespread problem, despite the anti-discrimination statutes
and their enforcement.
318. See GAO Finds 'Widespread Pattern of Discrimination' Prompts Calls for
Repeal of IRCA Employer Sanctions, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 62, at A-10 (finding that 19% of employers surveyed initiated discriminatory hiring policies in response
to IRCA). Ten percent of the employers surveyed discriminated on the basis of national origin, which meant that they asked for verification from or did not hire foreign
looking applicants. Id.
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ployers are particularly vulnerable. 319 Given Japan's recent economic
penetration of the United States, many Americans fear the prospect of
being "bought up" by the Japanese and are quick to criticize Japanese
business practices.320 A recent newspaper article noted that American
advertisers had created several advertisements that attack the Japanese
culture and people, all in an effort to prevent sales of Japanese made
products. 2 1 Pursuing a Japanese-only employment policy with respect
to key employees is unwise in such an atmosphere.
Japanese employers who insist on the primacy of the Japan Treaty
must recognize that even if they are correct, any employment practice
which is generally recognized to be discriminatory would have serious
consequences for their business. Boycotts, protests, and a further inflammation of anti-Japanese sentiment are all forseeable consequences.
Rather than risk such results, it would be more prudent (from a business perspective) for the Japanese employer to forego the legal rights
granted by the Japan Treaty, and focus on employee qualifications in
making employment decisions. Japanese companies would ensure themselves of getting the best candidates, while at the same time promoting
key social policies.
CONCLUSION
The Japanese employer doing business in the United States does
have the right, under article VIII(l) of the Japan Treaty, to favor its
own citizens for certain key positions. 22 Such a right likely prevails
over Title VII, but does not prevail over section 102(a) of IRCA. Japanese employers should adopt a qualifications-based employment policy,
including requirements for an understanding of Japanese business practices and cultural values. This ensures that the chosen applicant is
qualified, while at the same time avoids a Title VII or IRCA violation
and promotes good community and social relationships. For all these
reasons, the Japanese employer is advised to forego hiring key employ319. See J. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC
WAR 94-117 (1986) (declaring that the American media's portrayal of the Japanese as
"inhuman, lesser human, superhuman" during World War II is still revived in periods

of crisis).
320. See Rothenberg, Ads that Bash the Japanese:Just Jokers or Veiled Racism?.
N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at Al (describing a television commercial for a New York
area Pontiac dealer that announces "[i]t's December, and the whole family's going to
see the big Christmas tree at Hirohito Center. Go on, keep buying Japanese cars.").
321. Id.
322. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (providing the explicit language of
art. VIII(l)).

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 6:475

ees on the basis of citizenship or national origin and instead rely on
demonstrably relevant qualifications.

